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41 Introduction
The right to strike is an inextricable component of the right to associate and
bargain collectively. The right is unique in that it is a right which authorises
employees to use measures that may be economically detrimental to the employer.
So while the right is given protection in various forms it is not without limitation. It
is important that various affected parties rights are adequately balanced.
It is the purpose of this dissertation to clearly articulate what constitutes
unprotected strike action and thus the limits of protected strike action. Given the
significant consequences of a strike being declared unprotected, it is important that
all parties concerned, trade unions, employees and employers alike, are aware of the
requirements that must be met in order to render a strike protected.
Chapter one of this dissertation provides a brief overview of the importance of
the right to strike and how it is regulated internationally and nationally. Nationally
the right to strike is primarily regulated by the Labour Relations Aet 66 of 1995
which in turn is subordinate to the Constitution of the Republic of South Afiica, 
1996.^ The particular provisions within the LRA, and from time to time the
Constitution, are interpreted and clarified by way of judicial decisions.
' [Hereafter 'LRA']
^ [Hereafter 'Constitution']
5Chapter two addresses the kind of conduct which satisfies the definition of a
'strike' as contained within the LRA. This chapter concludes with a discussion of
whether protected strike action can be rendered unprotected as a result of violence
by, among others, reading limitations into the definition of'strike.' In this regard, the 
Labour Relations Amendment Act^ and Code of Good Practice, Collective
Bargaining, Industrial Action and Picketing'* are specifically considered.
Chapter three addresses both the substantive and procedural limitations
imposed on the right to strike by the LRA. Importantly, if a strike meets the
substantive requirements but fails to meet the procedural requirements it is
unprotected and vice versa. In so far as some of these requirements are concerned the
recent introduction of the Industrial Action Code has, in some instances, provided
clarity and confirmed the current legal position as set out in jurisprudence. In other
instances, the Industrial Action Code has introduced obligations not otherwise
contained in legislation or judicial decisions. These provisions will be considered in
this dissertation. The consequences arising out of unlawful strike action are also
briefly addressed in this chapter.
A conclusion is provided at the end of the dissertation.
^ 8 of 2018. [Hereafter 'Amendment Act']. The Amendment Act became effective as of 1 January 
2019.
^ [hereafter 'Industrial Action Code'].
62 Chapter one: An introduction to the right to strike
2.1 Introduction
It is useful when evaluating what constitutes 'strike action' and the requirements
that must be met in to render such action protected that the context of the right to
strike and its importance be taken into account. Often the context and purpose,
together with international and national jurisprudence, informs the manner in which
provisions in the LRA are interpreted by the courts. It is the purpose of this chapter
to provide such context.
The right to strike and its importance2.2
Recognition of the right to strike2.2.1
'It is not hard to see how in both the labour market and the labour process 
there will arise a general class relation between capital and labour that will 
inevitably.. .involve the state and law as arbitrator.. .Nothing stops the 
labourers individually or collectively agitating and fighting for more.. .Both 
capital and labour are within their rights to struggle over these issues and, as 
Marx famously put it, "between equal rights, force decides. Iii5
^ David Harvey Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism (2015) Penguin Books, Great 
Britain at 64.
7The history of the right to strike has been described as one that begins with 
repression, progresses to toleration and thereafter to recognition.'^ Law has
traditionally been hostile toward the recognition of the right to strike. This is due, in
.7part, to the intrinsic nature of the right which is designed to cause 'economic harm.
Under the common law, an employee who engaged in strike action breached
his / her contract of employment. As Halton Cheadle notes, the right to strike has a
long history of'legislative and judicial attempts to either suppress strikes or limit
their exercise. The first raft of measures was penal. The second was tortious 
[delictual] and the third was contractual.'* While the common law has been 
historically antagonistic towards strike action subsequent historical developments^
place strike action in an entirely different historical milieu.
The right is now constitutionally recognised. In recognising the right to strike
as a constitutional right one becomes cognisant of the types of conduct which would
render a strike unprotected as well as the need to balance such right against other
10constitutional rights.
® Halton Cheadle et al Strikes and the Law (2017) LexisNexis, South Africa at 1.
^ Ibid at 4. This is recognised in section 16(3) of the Industrial Action Code.
* Halton Cheadle 'Constitutionalising the Right to Strike' in B Hepple, R Le Roux and S Silvana (eds) 
Laws against Strikes: The South African Experience in an International and Comparative 
Perspective (2016) Juta, Cape Town at 52.
® Ibid at 53. For a useful summary on the history of the right to strike in South Africa see Anton 
Myburg '100 Years of Strike Law' (2004) 25 lU 962.
Section 16(5) of the Industrial Action Code records a number of other rights affected by the right to 
strike. Section 16(5) footnote 4 makes reference to ss 12(1), 16,17, 18 and 25 of the Constitution.
10
8\n National Unions of Metalworkers ofSA v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd^^ the Court,
in considering the importance of the right to strike, held as follows:
'In the first place, it is of importance for the dignity of workers who in our 
constitutional order may not be treated as coerced employees. Secondly, it is 
through industrial action that workers are able to assert bargaining power in 
industrial relations. The right to strike is an important component of a 
successful collective bargaining system. ?12
And later in the same judgment:
'The right to strike is essential to the process of collective bargaining. It is 
what makes collective bargaining work. It is to the process of collective 
bargaining what an engine is to a motor vehicle.' 13
Despite its inherent nature and ability to result in economic harm many
'democratic countries regard the..."'right to strike," as fundamental alongside 
freedom of association, the freedom to join and organise trade unions, freedom of 
assembly and freedom of speech.'*"^ In this regard. South Africa is no different in
recognising the importance of the right to strike.
2.2.2 Justifications for recognising the right to strike
11 (2003) 24 /ZJ305 (CC). [Hereafter 'BaderBop'].
Ibid at para 13. See also Cheadle, Davis and Haysom SA Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 
(2013), LexisNexis, South Africa at para 18.7.
Ibid at para 67.
B Hepple 'The Freedom to Strike and its Rationale' in B, Hepple, R, Le Roux and Sciarra Silvana 
(eds) Laws against Strikes: The South African Experience in an International and Comparative 
Perspective (2016) Juta, Cape Town at 12.
12
13
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9Various theories have been put forward justifying the need to recognise and
protect the right to strike. Kahn-Freund put forward the following four
.15justifications:
The need to counteract the inequality of bargaining power inherent in most2.2.2.1
employment relationships
Otto Kahn-Freund has argued that:
'the main object of labour law has always been, and 1 venture to say will 
always be, to be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of 
bargaining power which is inherent and must be inherent in the employment 
relationship'^®
This justification goes to the heart of the need for labour law in the first place.
An employment relationship cannot simply be regarded as another standard
commercial contractual relationship where the parties are exempt from the structural
inequality that inheres between capital and labour. This inequality arises out of the 
inequality in access to resources. In the absence of legislative oversight'® and
absent tools to effectively promote collective bargaining, employees could easily be
compelled to enter into asymmetrical contractual arrangements.
Cheadle op cit (n6) 5 to 7. 
*®Ibidat5.
Ibid.
18 For example, the establishment of minimum terms and conditions of employment.
10
This is especially true of South Africa where the supply of unskilled labour
vastly outweighs that of demand. In such circumstances, necessity becomes a form of
coercion for employees who would have no other choice but to accept prejudicial
terms of employment.
The right to strike then offers a means of countervailing the inequality of
bargaining positions otherwise characteristic of the employment relationship. The
law regulates the maimer in which this is to be achieved. In this regard, 'labour law
provides clear and defined channels by which conflict between employees and
il9employers can be directed and as such the economic system can be preserved.
2222 The need to facilitate the parties' autonomy to regulate the employment
relationship.
The right to strike allows for a means for employees to temper the employer’s
election to change conditions of employment.
Kahn-Freund has argued that:
'the power to withdraw their labour is for workers what for management is 
the power to shut down production, to switch it to different purposes, to 
transfer it to different places. A legal system that suppresses that freedom to 
strike puts workers at the mercy of their employers. i20
DM Davis 'The functions of labour law' 8 CILSA (1980) 213 at 215. See also K Klare Laboiu Law 
as Ideology: Towards a New Histiography of Collective Bargaining Law 4 Indus.Rel.LJ (1981)
450.
20 Cheadle op cit (n6) 6.
11
Cheadle argues that it is this consideration that provides the justification 'not
only for the right to strike but also for the autonomy of labour law from the legal
i21system as a whole.
An employer must have the flexibility to operate its business. This discretion
typically covers areas of managerial decision making. However, there are certain
areas where managerial decision making must be tempered. Collective bargaining,
and its central component, the right to strike, offers employees a means to control
management’s authority where it oversteps or otherwise unduly impinges on 
employees' rights and interests. In this manner, a form of'industrial self- 
government'^^ is promoted. It also allows flexibility and satisfies the need to adjust to 
changing circumstances timeously.^^ In addition, the parties themselves are often
best placed to come to agreements without the assistance of outside parties such as
the judiciary.
2.2.2.3 The fireedom to withhold labour
The fireedom to work 'includes a fi-eedom not to work (which would include
engaging in strike action). As Kahn-Freud states "if people may not withdraw their
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
12
ii»24labour, this may mean that the law compels them to work. While an employee
cannot be forced to work there are nonetheless limitations on how they withdraw
their labour. Failure to adhere to these requirements may result in a breach of the 
employees' contracts of employment.^^ For this reason the provisions of the LRA
must be adhered to before engaging in strike action.
262.2.2.4 The regulated release of social and economic pressure.
In South Africa, employees have rights to strike,^^ picket and engage in
protest action. In this manner, the rights to assembly, demonstration, picket and
petition is separately regulated under s 17 of the Constitution, s 77 of the LRA and 
the Regulation of Gatherings Act^* respectively. This is because protest action is
called for a different reason than strike action. It is to draw attention to socio­
economic issues.^^ While political issues cannot be addressed by way of protest
action it can be by way of the Gatherings Act. The right to strike, in particular.
allows for a release of economic pressure.
Ibid 4, footnote 27, and 6 to 7. See also the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (no 29).
Ibid 7. This would be the case in the instance of unprotected strike action.
This can also be connected to the 'regulated release of physiological tension.' See Hepple op cit 
(nl4) 25.
Section 23 of the Constitution and s 64 of the LRA.
205 of 1993, as amended [hereafter 'Gatherings Act']. As per s 24(5) of the Industrial Action Code, 
this piece of legislation is excluded in circumstances where picketers meet the requirements of s 
69 the LRA.
28
29 Section 77 of the LRA. These rights are, however, recognised as important by the ILO. A Van 
Niekerk (ed), N Smith (ed), M A Christianson et al Law@Work 3ed (2015) LexisNexis, Durban at
432.
13
2.2.2.5 Human right?
Bob Hepple argues that to these four typical justifications can be added a 
fifth: human rights.^” As Cheadle notes, 'the logical origins of the right to strike as a 
human right are probably the confluence of at least three rights: the right not to be
forced to labour, freedom of association and the right to dignity, culminating in the 
right to strike itself'^* The argument to treat the right to strike as a human right,
32however, is controversial and not without its detractors.
The hierarchy of laws2.3
In South Africa, the field of labour law is regulated by various sources of law:
the Constitution, legislation including, but not being limited to, the LRA, the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997,^^ the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
and the common law. The sources of labour law are ultimately subject to the
Constitution.
2.3.1 The Constitution and the right to strike
30 Cheadle op cit (n6) 6 to 7. See also Hepple op cit (nl4) 40 to 43
31 Ibid.
32 Not least by the employers' group to the ILO who have difficulty in recognising a right to strike in 
the first place. See DF Frey 'Conflict over Conflict: The Rights to Strike in International Law' 
Global Labour Journal (2017) 8(1) 17 -31, JR Bellace 'The ILO and the Rights to Strike' 153 Int’l 
Lab.rew 29 (2014) 29 and L Swepston, 'Crisis in the ILO Supervisory System; Dispute over the 
Right to Strike' International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations (2013) 
29(2) 199-218.
[Hereafter'BCEA'].33
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Section 1(c) of the Constitution provides that 'the Republic of South Africa is
one, sovereign democratic state founded on the following values; supremacy of the
Constitution and the Rule of Law.' Section 2 of the Constitution furthermore
provides that the 'Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct
inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.'
Section 23(2)(c) of die Constitution expressly provides that 'every worker has
the right to strike.' Significantly, the constitutional enactment of the right contains no
express mention of any limitations to the right to strike. In South African Transport
and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU) v Moloto NCf^ the Court held that:
'the right to strike is protected as a fundamental right in the Constitution 
without express limitation. Constitutional rights conferred without express 
limitation should not be cut down by reading implicit limitations into them 
and when legislative provisions limit or intrude upon those rights they should 
be interpreted in a manner less restrictive on the right if the text is reasonably 
capable of bearing that meaning. •35
In Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,^^ the
Constitutional Court acknowledged the intricate relationship between the
constitutional right to collective bargaining and the right to strike. This right entails.
at a minimum, the freedom to bargain collectively and the right to utilise strike action 
in the interests of pursuing such bargaining.^’ln the absence of tbe right to strike.
34 2012 (ll)BCLRl 177 (LC).
” Para 43.
1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC). 
Cheadle op cit (nl2) para 18.7.1.37
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employees' ability to effectively bargain will be significantly curtailed. The Court
held that:
'Collective bargaining is based on the recognition of the fact that employers 
enjoy greater social and economic power than individual workers. Workers, 
therefore, need to act in concert to provide them collectively with sufficient 
power to bargain effectively with employers. Workers exercise collective 
power primarily through the mechanism of strike action. i38
Section 23(5) of the Constitution provides for a right to collective bargaining
and states that:^^
'Every trade union, employers' organisation and employer has the right to 
engage in collective bargaining. National legislation may be enacted to 
regulate collective bargaining. To the extent that the legislation may limit a 
right in this Chapter, the limitation must comply with section 36(1). .40
Importantly s 23(5) recognises that while the Constitution is supreme, its
purpose is not to fully delineate and regulate generally stated rights, such as the right
to strike action. Rather, this is to be achieved by the enactment of specific legislation,
the purpose of which is to give content to such rights. Cheadle notes that 'a generally
stated right contemplates that its primary function is to guarantee the right, leaving 
its content to be determined by regulation.It is in terms of such legislation that the
limits of the right are more fully detailed. The applicable legislation in the present
instance is the ERA.
38 Para 66.
Andre Van Heerden 'Assignment 1: Collective Labour Law' University of Cape Town (1 September 
2015).
Emphasis added.
Cheadle op cit (n6) 14.
40
41
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There are limits, however, to the manner in which legislation, including the
LRA, can give content to a constitutional right. Legislation which fails to adhere to
and comply with the provisions of the Constitution is liable to be struck down or
otherwise interpreted in a manner which renders it consistent with such constitutional
right. This is because any limitation introduced by the legislation must be in
accordance with the provisions of s 36 of the Constitution. This too is expressly
referred to in s 23(5) of the Constitution.
Section 36 of the Constitution broadly provides that a proportionality analysis
must be undertaken when competing rights are at play. The section provides lhat:
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of laws of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including —
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the 
Constitution, no law may limit any ri^t entrenched in the Bill of Rights.
17
How s 23(5) of the Constitution has been given effect to by the LRA and, in certain
instances, how such provisions have stood up to judicial scrutiny will be addressed in
detail below.
The LRA and the right to strike2.3.2
To promote a more flexible approach the LRA adopted a system of 
voluntarism'^^ where issues such as bargaining agents, bargaining subjects and
bargaining levels are best left to be determined by the parties relying on their
bargaining strength.’'*^ The LRA ensures this flexibility by forgoing a judicially 
enforceable duty to bargain'^^ and replacing it with two mechanisms designed to
44
46facilitate collective bargaining: the introduction of specified organisational rights, 
as well as a legislatively recognised and protected right to strike.'^’ The LRA
'seeks to secure only the means of collective bargaining, without prescribing, or 
empowering the courts to prescribe how these means should be exercised, or
42 For a useful discussion on voluntarism see D M Davis 'Voluntarism and South African Labour Law: 
Are the Queensbury Rules an Anachronism?' Acta Juridica (1990) 45 at 51 to 52.
D Du Toit, D Bosch, D Woolfrey et at Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 6ed (2015), 
LexisNexis, Durban at 279. See also Van Heerden Op Cit (n39).
It is, arguably, enforceable by other means such as by way of agreement. See AA Landman 'The 
development of a common law duty to negotiate in good faith' (2018) 27(4) Contemporary Labour 
Law A\ and John Grogan Workplace Law 12ed (2017) Juta, Cape Town at 344.
See Minister of Defence v SA National Defense Union (2006) 27 JU 2276 (SCA) at para 25, SA 
National Defence Union v Minister of Defence [2007] 9 BLLR 785 (CC) at para's 53 to 56 and 
section 4(4) of the Industrial Action Code.
Sections 12 to 16 of the LRA.
S Godfrey, J Maree and D Du Toit et al Collective Bargaining in South Africa: Past, Present & 
Future? (2010) Juta, South Africa at 66 and Carl Mishke ‘Getting a foot in the Door: Organisational 
Rights and Collective Bargaining in terms of the LRA’ Contemporary Labour Law 13 (2004) 51 at
43
44
45
47
52.
18
how it should be concluded. In the final analysis then the right to strike...still 
determines the outcome of collective bargaining. i48
The explanatory memorandum to the LRA expressly records the 'need to
entrench the constitutional right to strike subject to limitations which are reasonable
and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on values of freedom and
i49equality.
2.3.3 The International Labour Organisation and the right to strike
Section 233 of the Constitution provides that 'when interpreting any
legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation
that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is
inconsistent with international law.' Furthermore, ss 39(l)(b) and 39(1 )(c) of the
Constitution provide that 'when interpreting the Bill of Rights [the right to strike
being contained therein], a court, tribrmal or forum must consider international law 
and may consider foreign law.'^*’ So when determining, among others, whether a
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society, 
consideration must also be had, with appropriate caution,^' to international
jurisprudence. Consideration may also be given to foreign law.
‘^^Grogan op cit (n44) at 344 to 345.
‘‘^'The Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Act' 1995 16 /L/279. See P Maserumule 'A 
perspective on developments in strike law' (2001) 22 lU 45 who critiques the idea that the right to 
strike should be limited. For a counter argument see Cheadle op cit (n8).
Emphasis added.
Consideration must be given to local circumstances in any particular instance.
50
51
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Section 1(b) of the LRA provides that one of its purposes is to 'give effect to
obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the International Labour 
Organisation'^^ while s 3(c) of the LRA provides that 'any person interpreting [the
LRA] must interpret its provisions in compliance with the public international
obligations of the Republic.'
Internationally, 'the framework in which collective bargaining [of which the
right to strike is an essential component] must take place if it is to be viable is based
on the principle of independence and autonomy of the parties and the free and 
voluntary nature of negotiations.'^^ As discussed, this emphasis on voluntarism has
been replicated within the LRA which has as one of its objectives the facilitation of a
54framework within which parties can bargain.
South Africa has ratified a number of the ILO's Conventions including the 
ILO Convention on the Right to Organise and Bargain Collectively^^ and the 
Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise Convention.^^ While these
conventions say nothing expressly about the right to strike, the ILO supervisory
bodies have 'built up a body of principles which recognise that the right to strike is an
intrinsic corollary to the right to organise, and a fundamental right of workers and of
52 [Hereafter 'ILO'].
Bernard Gemigon, Alberto Odero, and Horacio Guido 'ILO Principles Concerning Collective 
Bargaining' (2000) 139(1) International Law Review 33 at 34.
Section 1 of the LRA.
The Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1948 (No 98) [hereafter 'Convention 
98']. South Afiica ratified this convention on 19 February 1996.
The Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No 87) [hereafter 
'Convention 87']. South Africa ratified this convention on 19 February 1996.
53
56
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their organisations.'^’ This has been achieved, in part, by reliance on the protection of
the right to freedom of association as contained in Convention 87.
The ILO supervisory bodies, including both the Freedom of Association
Committee and its Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations, have interpreted Convention 87 in a manner whieh recognises the
right to strike as 'one of the essential means available to workers to further and
defend their occupational interests.'^* Importantly, however, is the recognition by
both bodies that 'there is no absolute or unlimited right to strike.' In fact, in recent
years the employers' group at the ILO have sou^t to undermine the argument that
59there is an internationally recognised right to strike at all.
In addition to Conventions 87 and 98 the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1996, which was ratified by South Africa
with effect from 12 April 2015, provides that a party to the Covenant must undertake
to ensure that the right to strike is provided for, provided that it is exercised in
conformity with the laws of a particular country.®® The provisions of the African
57 J Servais 'ILO Law and the Right to Strike' 15 Canadian Lab. & Emp. L.J. 147 (2009 - 2010) 147 at 
149. Freedom of Association: Digest of Decisions of the Freedom of Association Committee of 
the Governing Body of the ILO (2016) at para's 522 to 523, General Survey of Freedom of 
Association (1994) 66 and Gemigon op cit (n53).
Servais op cit (n57) 150. Freedom of Association: Digest of Decisions of the Freedom of 
Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO (2016) at para 523, General Survey of 
Freedom of Association (1994) 66 and Gemigon op cit n53.
Cheadle op cit (n6) 9. See Frey (n32), Bellace (n32) and Swepstron (n32).
Art 8(1 )(d).
58
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Commission on Human Rights and Peoples Rights have similarly been interpreted to
61include the right to strike.
Importantly, the ILO also recognises that 'national law sometimes imposes
conditions that must be met in order to render a strike protected. Such conditions
should be reasonable, and in any event not so complicated as to make a legal strike 
practically impossible.To this end, 'one of the main lessons to be drawn from
international experience is that no two countries are alike when it comes to regulating 
strikes.'^^ In this regard
'the international standards are flexible and open-ended and provide rich 
justifications for restrictions on the right to strike. The use that each coimtry 
makes of these standards, and the restrictions it adopts, are the outcome of the 
particular political, social and economic struggles that have led to demands 
for a right to strike. i64
In this regard, the LRA is no different in providing certain restrictions on the
right to strike which have, in part, been formed by the political, social and economic
factors of South Africa.
2,3.4 Common law
T Novitz 'The International and Regional Framework' in B Hepple, R Le Roux and Sciarra Silvana 
(eds) Laws against Strikes: The South African Experience in an International and Comparative 
Perspective (2016) Juta, Cape Town at 46.
Servais op cit (n57) 156.
Hepple op cit (nl4) 13.
^ B Hepple 'The Right to Strike in an International Context' 15 Canadian Lab. & Emp.L.J. (2009- 
2010) 133 at 134 to 135.
62
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In addition to the Constitution, the LRA and international law content is
given to the right to strike by way of the common law in the form of judicial
decisions which often clarify and guide the manner in which protected strike action is
regulated in South Afiica.
23
Chapter two: Defining a strike3
Introduction3.1
Before considering what constitutes an 'unprotected strike' it is necessary to
look at what constitutes a 'strike' in the first instance. It is only onee this issue is
clarified that consideration can be given to whether a strike (as defined) is to be
regarded as unprotected or not.
Defining 'strike' action3.2
Section 213 of file LRA defines a 'strike' as being:
'the partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or 
obstruction of work, by persons who are or have been employed by the 
same employer or by different employers, for the purpose of remedying a 
grievance or resolving a dispute in respect of any matter of mutual 
interest between employer and employee, and every reference to "work" in 
this definition includes overtime work, whether it is voluntary or 
compulsory. i65
The definition of a strike makes it clear that a number of conditions need to
be met before conduct can constitute 'strike action.' Understanding these conditions
are important for two reasons: Firstly, 'only strikes, as defined, are subject to the
65 Emphasis added.
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procedxiral and substantive requirements set out in the LRA.'^^ Secondly, the internal
requirements place limitations on what kind of conduct qualifies for the protections 
afforded by the right to strike.^’ The protections and immunities provided for by the
LRA are briefly discussed in chapter three.
In Transport and Allied Workers Union of SA obo Ngedle v Unitrans Fuel
and Chemical (Pty) Ltdf^ the Court held that:
'there are four elements or components that make up a strike under the LRA. 
In everyday parlance, people call every collective stay-away from work or 
work stoppage a strike. Under the LRA a strike must have Ae four elements.'
These four elements are inherent qualifications^^ on what constitutes 'strike
action.' They are, broadly, as follows:
(a) Stoppage or disruption of work;
Committed by employees against an employer;
For the purposes of remedying a grievance or dispute; 
in respect of a matter of mutual interest.
(b)
(c)
(d)
Stoppage or disruption of work3.2.1
“ Cheadle op cit (n6) 48.
Certain conduct, such as protect action for instance, may nonetheless enjoy other forms of 
protection.
2016 (11) BCLR 1440 (LC). Cheadle op cit (n6) 49.
For a discussion of the various inherent qualifications see John Grogan Collective Labour Law led 
(2014) Juta, Cape Town at 195 to 214 and D Du Toit et al 'Labour Law through the Cases (2005) 
accessed at http://lexisnexis/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates$fn=default.htm$vid=mylnb:10.1048/enu 
on 20 Jime 2018.
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The reference to a 'partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the
retardation or obstruction of work ensures that the 'right to strike is given the widest
i70possible meaning. This is in contrast to some countries like France, for instance.
i71where 'a go-slow or retardation of work is not a 'strike' and is not protected.
The statutory definition of'strike' is wide enough to encompass not-only
complete refusals to work but also so-called 'go-slows', 'work-to rule strike', 'grass­
hopper strikes' industrial sabotage and sit-ins.Go-slows' refer to situations where
employees continue to work but do so at a pace which has been deliberately slowed
down. 'Work-to rule' strikes mean that employees comply only and exactly with their
terms and conditions of employment but refuse to do anything further as a means of
reducing efficiency. 'Grass-hopper strikes' are where employees engage in
intermittent work stoppages' and 'sit-ins' are where employees sit in their workplace
without performing work. To constitute 'strikes' all of the above acts must also meet
the further requirements discussed below.
Generally speaking, a strike only pertains to an obstmction or refusal to
perform work that employees are contractually obliged to perform, the exception
being overtime. A refusal to work overtime, even if voluntary, may constitute a
70 Hepple op cit (nl4) 14. See also CWIU v Plascon Decorative (Inland) (Pty) Ltd [1998] 12 BLLR 
1191 (LC).
71 Ibid.
’^Grogan op cit (n44) 407.
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strike.’^ One further exception is noted by John Grogan. This is where 'off-duty
i74employees' perform acts which result in the retardation or obstmction of work.
Furthermore, the work required to be performed must be lawful. There can be
no strike action where employees fail to perform unlawful action. For instance, in 
Simba (Pty) Ltd v FA Wlf^ 'where employees had refused to do work in terms of a
collective agreement that in was in breach of the BCEA, it was held that the word
i76'work' did not include work that would be illegal to perform.
Where employees refuse to work due to the failure by their employer to
comply with agreed upon contractual obligations courts initially regarded such action
as falling short of strike action; rather, employees were obliged to rely on the existing 
right that could be enforced.’’ This position, however, was altered in NUM obo 
employees v CCMA’ ^ where the Court found that 'a work stoppage in response to 
unlawful conduct by the employer fell within the definition of a "strike.'"’^
By employees (concerted action) against an employer3.2.2
Ibid. See also Kgasago v Meat 'n More Spaza [1998] 1 BLLR 69 (LC).
Grogan op cit (n44) 406.
(1997) 18 /L/558 (LC) at page 568.
Cheadle op cit (n6) 50.
Nkutha V Fuel Gas Installations (Pty) Ltd (2000) 2 BLLR 178 (LC). See also Du Toit op cit (n69). 
(2012) 1 BLLR 22 (LAC). See also Du Toit op cit (n69).
’9 Ibid.
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The strike must be affected by employees against an employer. For instance,
'a dispute between two trade unions, or between a trade union and its members, or
amongst employees, is not strikeable.'*^ The strike need not be against the employer
of the employees concerned. The definition is therefore wide enough to cover strikes 
against another employer (so-called 'secondary strikes') as well.** Primary and
82secondary strikes have separate requirements as set out in the LRA. While a
primary strike is for the purpose of the employees remedying a grievance in which
they have a vested interest, a secondary strike, or so-called sympathy strike, is to
83assist other employees to bring pressure to bear upon their employer.
In addition, in Tiger Wheels Babelegi (Pty) v NUMSA'^^ the Court held that
'the definition of'strike' in s 213 of the LRA was wide enough to protect an industry­
wide strike against a challenge by an individual employer even though there was no
i85issue in dispute between that employer and the employees concerned.
80 Cheadle op cit (n6) 56.
CWIU V Plascon Decorative (Inland) (Pty) Ltd [1998] 12 BLLR 1191 (LAC).
Section 64 of the LRA addresses 'primary strikes' whereas section 66 of the LRA addresses 
'secondary strikes.'
Section 66 of the LRA defines a secondary strike as 'a strike, or conduct, in contemplation or 
furtherance of a strike, that is in support of a strike by other employees against their employer but 
does not include a strike in pursuit of a demand that has been referred to a council if the striking 
employees, employed within the registered scope of the coxmcil, have a material interest in that 
demand.' A detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
[1999] 1 BLLR 66 (LC) [hereafter 'Tiger Wheels' case]. See Cheadle op cit (n6) 51.
Du Toit op cit (n69).
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It has been suggested by some commentators that as 'the Bill of Rights®® vests
the right to strike in "every worker", it is not obvious why individual workers should
be precluded from exercising the right even if they possess the necessary bargaining
i87power to exercise it, or whether their exclusion is constitutionally justified.
In contrast, other commentators have held that the Constitution recognises 
that the right to strike is an independent and individual®* right but that the right must 
be exercised collectively.®^ One person is incapable of engaging in strike action.^*^ 
The 'failure or refusal to work must [then] be concerted and must be engaged in by
.91persons.
In Schoeman v Samsung Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd,^^ the Court held that a 
single employee is incapable of striking. Furthermore, in Moloto^ the
Constitutional Court made it clear that a single employee was incapable of engaging
in strike action. There must, therefore, be concerted activity by more than one
employee for the conduct to constitute strike action.
86 Chapter two of the Constitution.
Cheadle op cit (n6) 56.
Hepple op cit (nl4) 17.
Cheadle op cit (n8) 55.
^SATAWUvMoloto [2012] 12 BLLR 1193 (CC) at para 34 [Hereafter 'Moloto'].
Grogan op cit (n44) 407.
[1997] 10 BLLR 1364 (LC).
However, in para 23 of Co-Operative Worker Association v Petroleum Oil & Gas Co-Operative of 
SA [2017] 1 BLLR 55 (LC) the opposite sentiment was expressed by way of an obiter remark. As 
a result it carries little weight.
Supra (n90). See also Du Toit op cit (n69).
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Importantly, in Food and General Workers Union v Minister of Safety and 
Security the Court recognised that employees who have been dismissed may not
thereafter engage in strike action. However, to the extent that employees have been
dismissed during on-going strike action, it would be lawful to persist with such strike
action for the duration of the strike. For this purpose, their employment is thus
extenuated. In other words, the definition of employees' is then extended to
encompass former employees. The recognition that a strike will remain protected.
even where all the employees have been dismissed by the employer, is an important
96one.
The Court noted that the 'effect of [the LRA] is to suspend the operation of 
the contract [of employment] for the duration of the protected strike to enable the 
parties to resolve the dispute by power play.'^^ The Court went on to explain that part
of the power-play which may be used by an employer is the power to dismiss
employees, provided such dismissal is not in contravention of s 67(5) of the LRA.
98Any dismissals in contravention of this section would be a nullity.
This makes sense; in the absence of such protection employers would simply
dismiss strikers as a means of ending the strike. Thus in Picardi Hotels Ltd v
95 (1999) 20/ZJ1258 (LC).
In 'Afrox Ltd V SACWU; SACWU v Afrox Ltd [1997] BLLR 382 (LC) it was held that the provision 
for former employees to engage in strike action does not extend to persons who are aggrieved by 
their dismissal itself. This is so, Landman J found, because strike action is impermissible if the 
issue in dispute is capable of being referred to arbitration or adjudication. Du Toit op cit (n69).
Supra (n95) at para 19.
Ibid.
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FGWlfi^ the Court held that 'employees could strike beyond the point of dismissal.
To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, would mean that an employer could avoid a
strike simply by dismissing the employees before the commencement of the
ilOOstrike. An employer's ability to simply dismiss employees is also significantly
101constrained by the unlawful dismissal provisions in the LRA.
However, and importantly for present purposes, this does not apply to
dismissals effected for engaging in unprotected strike action. The Court held, having
regard to s 68 of the LRA, that protected strikes are treated on a separate basis to
unprotected strikes. So too are dismissals effected following unprotected strikes.
102Dismissals so effected bring the employment relationship to an immediate end.
Remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute3.2.3
In order to qualify as a 'strike,' the action must be undertaken for the purposes
of remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute in respect of a matter of mutual
interest between an employer and employees.*®^ As such, protest action would not
qualify as a strike (although it is protected by other means). This is because protest
99 [1999] 6 BLLR 601 (LC). See also Cheadle op cit (n6) 51.
Cheadle op cit (n6) 51.
See, in particular, ss 186, 187, 193 and 194 of the LRA. Section 187(l)(a) expressly states that 'a 
dismissal is automatically unfair... if the reason for the dismissal is that the employee participated 
in or supported, or indicated an intention to participate in or support, a strike or protest action that 
complies with the provisions of Chapter IV of the LRA.
Supra (n95) para's 20 and 21.
Section 213 of the LRA.
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action is focused on socio-economic issues, the target of which is often the State and
104not the employer.
Ultimately, it is not enough for a group of employees to simply refuse to
105work; such refusal must be for a purpose. In TSI Holdings (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA, the
Court recognised that:
'the issue in dispute underlying a strike may still be identified by the strikers' 
demand, because the term "issue in dispute" is in turn defined as "the 
demand, grievance or the dispute that forms the subject-matter of the 
strike. .11106
It is essential that employees' refusal to work be for the purpose of remedying 
a grievanee or resolving a dispute. If not, their actions fall short of a strike and will 
not be protected.*®^ For instance, in Simba (Pty) Ltd v FA employees simply
refused to work a shift system when instructed to do so. The Court held that this
merely amounted to a 'concerted refusal to work. The employees have raised no
.109complaint; they have articulated no demands. In dismissing the employees'
complaint the Court stated:
104 See ss 77 and 213 of the LRA. Section 213 of the LRA defines "protest action' as 'the partial or 
complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or obstruction of work, for the purpose of 
promoting or defending the socio-economic interests of workers, but not for a purpose 
referred to in the definition of strike' (emphasis added).
(2006) 27 lU 1483 (LAC) [hereafter 'TSIHoldings'],
Grogan op cit (n69) 196.
See SASTWUv Karras t/a Floraline [1999] 10 BLLR 1097 (LC).
Supra (n75). Grogan op cit (n44) 409.
Ibid para 17.
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’I have examined the papers carefully to determine whether or not there is a 
demand, a grievance or a dispute which the second to further respondents 
require to be resolved. I regret that I am unable to find any evidence of 
anything other than a concerted refusal to work. The employees have raised 
no complaint; they have articulated no demand. >110
In such cases, the employees’ conduct may constitute a form of misconduct
(such as insubordination or failure to perform their duties and functions), rendering
them subject to appropriate disciplinary action.
Furthermore, in FA WU v Rainbow Chicken Farms^ ^ * the employees had
refused to work on a religious holiday. It was held that the employees 'had not sought
ill2to remedy a grievance or resolve a dispute. As will become apparent below, it is
important that employees clearly articulate their demands to an employer. While it is
arguable, in terms of FAWU, that there was an implicit demand that religious
employees should not have to work on religious holidays a potential alternative
course of action (as opposed to engaging in unprotected strike action) would have
113been lodging an unfair discrimination dispute.
Conversely, there can generally be no strike where the demand of the
114employees is itself unlawful. In TSI Holdings, the Court held that it would be
no Ibid para 18.
[2000] 1 BLLR 70 (LC) [hereafter 'FAWlf],
Grogan op cit (n44) 409.
See TDF Network Africa (Pty) Ltd v Paris (CA 4/17) [2018] ZALAC 30 (5 November 2018). Note 
para's 42 and 43 where the Court expressly distinguished its facts fi-om that of the FA WU case.
(2006) 27 lU 1483 (LAC). Grogan op cit (n44) 409. See also National Union of Public Service 
and Allied Workers v National Lotteries Board 2014 (6) BCLR 663 (LC) and Cheadle op cit (n6)
Ill
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13
114
22.
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unlawful for employees to demand a supervisor be fired without due process having
been followed. However, a demand that a supervisor be lawfully disciplined in a 
manner which may lead to dismissal^is acceptable.
What is required, however, is a careful and critical assessment of what
constitutes an 'unlawful demand.' For example, in Bidvest Food Services (Pty) Ltd 
and NUMSA, Gallant & 158 others^^^ the National Union of Metalworkers"’
engaged in strike action in an effort to obtain organisational rights in the workplace
of the employer, Bidvest. NUMSA and Bidvest operated in different industries.
NUMSA in the metal industry and Bidvest in the food industry. The dispute arose
because Bidvest refused to grant NUMSA organisational rights, arguing that
NUMSA was barred by its own constitution fi-om organising in the industry to which
Bidvest belongs.
As a result of Bidvest's refusal to grant it organisational rights, NUMSA
referred the matter to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration"*
for conciliation. Bidvest raised a point in limine at the CCMA. It argued that the
CCMA lacked jurisdiction to entertain the dispute because the CCMA was unable to
115 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v SAMWU [2011] 7 BLLR 663 (LC) and Metro 
Bus (Pty) Ltd V SAMWU obo Members [2009] 9 BLLR 905 (LC). For a critique of this latter case 
see Grogan op cit (n69) 211 to 212.
[2014] ZALCCT 58. See J Van Wyk and A van Heerden 'Striking in support of a demand for 
Organisational rights in a workplace outside the scope of a trade union's constitution' accessed at 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/striking-in-support-of-a-demand-for-organisational-rights-in-a-  
workplace-outside-the-scope-of-a-trade-unions-constitution-2015-01-06 on 28 January 2019 
which offers a useful summary of the case and the legal principles applicable thereto.
[Hereafter 'NUMSA'].
[Hereafter 'CCMA'].
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grant NUMSA the rights it sought. The CCMA disagreed and a certificate of
outcome was issued certifying the dispute as unresolved.
Normally, NUMSA would have an election to either refer the matter to
arbitration in an effort to obtain organisational rights or engage in strike aetion.
However, NUMSA would have difficulty in referring the matter to arbitration, as the
119following cases show.
In SATAWUv Telekleen / Compukleen^^^ the union, SATAWU, sought 
organisational rights fi'om an employer. The employer objected, arguing, by way of a
preliminary point, that the members the imion sought to recruit fell outside the seope
of the union's constitution. The CCMA agreed, holding that the application for 
organisational rights was defective. The preliminary point was thus upheld. 
Similarly, in CEPPWA WU/Pop Snacks^^^ the CCMA held that a union may only
operate in sectors in which it is allowed to in terms of its constitution to which it is
bound. In other words, the union had no right to demand organisational rights in a
workplace falling outside the scope of their constitution.
NUMSA then issued a strike notice indicating it wished to engage in strike
action in order to compel Bidvest to provide it with organisational rights. In
response, Bidvest approached the Labour Court on an urgent basis in an effort to
119 Section 65(2) of the LRA.
(2010) 7 BALR 768 (CCMA). 
(2009) 11 BALR 1156 (CCMA).
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have the strike declared unprotected. Bidvest argued that the strike was unprotected
because the nature of NUMSA's demand, to organise in an industry outside the scope
of its own constitution, was unlawful.
The Court held that 'the legality of a strike is not dependent on the probable
success or legal merits of the demand, whether the trade union organising the strike
is registered, whether the participating workers are members of that trade union or
whether the trade union operates within the industry in which the employer’s
1 122workplace falls.
The Court reasoned that the right to strike was a right possessed by every
employee. There can be no bar on such employees going on strike in:
'an effort to obtain rights and strike an agreement through collective 
bargaining and power play. That is a right that every worker has. The demand 
of the workers in this case is that NUMSA must be allowed to represent them 
and to exercise the organisational rights set out in section 21 of the LRA.
That is a demand in respect of a matter of mutual interest. It is not 
unlawful.' 123
The Court thus held that:
'Section 23(2)(c) of the Constitution guarantees, for every worker, the right to 
strike. That right is limited only by the provisions of section 64 of the LRA. 
In the case before me, the workers cited as respondents have complied with 
those provisions. They have acquired the right to strike. That right should not 
be further limited by reading into the provisions of ss 64 and 65(2) a
122 Van Wyk op cit (nl 16).
Supra (nl 16) para's 18 and 19.123
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provision that workers may not strike in pursuit of a demand for 
organisational rights for a union that is restricted in its scope hy its own 
constitution. il24
In other words, while NUMSA did not have a right to demand organisational
rights, it nonetheless could demand organisational rights as a matter of mutual
interest. Engaging in strike action was a means of compelling Bidvest to nonetheless
enter into a collective agreement with NUMSA outside of the confines of s 21 of the
ERA (ie in terms of s 20 of the ERA). This demand was not of the same nature as a
demand to perform an unlawful act because the outcome could, within the confines
of the ERA, be lawfully achieved, just not through the mechanism of arbitration.
Grogan states that the grievance or dispute must exist at the time of the
dispute. If the grievance or dispute does not exist at the time of the work stoppage.
125then clearly there can be no strike.
Once a dispute or grievance has been resolved, the strike ends. Any strike 
action committed after such time may be regarded as unprotected. In Afrox Ltd v
127SA Chemical Worker's union (2) the Court held that;
'once the dispute giving rise to the strike is resolved, the strike must end and 
the right to strike must fall away. The Court explained that the strike can
124 Supra (nl 16) para 23.
Grogan op cit (n69) 204.
Ceramic Industries Limited v NCBA WU [1997] 5 BLLR 546 (LC) and Pikitup (Soc) Ltd v SAMWU 
(2) 2013 11 BLLR 1118 (LC). See also Du Toil op cit (n69).
(1997) 18/ZJ 406 (LC).
125
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terminate in various ways: First, the strikers can abandon the strike and 
unconditionally return to work. Second, the 'substratum'...has disappeared. 
This can happen where the employer concedes to the demands of the strikers 
or removes the grievance or resolves the dispute. 1128
In Transport and Allied Workers Union of SA obo Ngedle v Unitrans Fuel
and Chemical (Pty) Ltd,™ the Court held that 'a protected strike can only become
unprotected if it continues beyond the point where the employer tully and
il30unconditionally complies with the demand or the strikers alter their demand. The
latter reference to a change of demand is important in that a union may only strike on
those issues which have been the subject matter of conciliation as more fully
discussed below.
3.2.4 Matters of mutual interest
In order to constitute a strike, the demand must be in respect of a matter of
'mutual interest' between employees and an employer, a phrase which, as Grogan
131notes, is open to extremely wide interpretation.
The courts have, in fact, shown a willingness to give a wide meaning to what
constitutes matters of mutual interest.' In Vanachem Vanadium Products (Pty) Ltd v
128 A J Rycroft 'Can a protected strike lose its status?' (2012) 33 /i7821 at 824. 
2016 (11) BCLR 1440 (CC).
Cheadle op cit (n6) 54.
Grogan op cit (n69) 205.
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National Union ofMetalworkers of South Africa^^^ the Court indicated that the
phrase 'matters of mutual interest' must be given a wide meaning to include all
matters of concern to the employment relationship and must not be confined to be
matters concerning the wellbeing of the enterprise. 133
In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v SAMWU,^^^ the Court
il35also held that a 'matter of mutual interest.. .is any matter concerning employment.
The 'sweeping phrase seemingly encompasses issues of employment in general, and
il36is not limited strictly to matters pertaining to wages and conditions of service. For
137instance, in Pikitup (SOC) Ltd v SAMWU obo Members, a dispute over health and
safety, with particular regard to the proposal to introduce breathalysers in the
workplace, was found to constitute a 'matter of mutual interest.' In making its ruling
the Court, while noting the wide definition of the term 'matter of mutual interest,'
held as follows:
'The phrase mutual interest seeks to limit the issues that may form the subject 
matter of a strike. It can therefore not be without boundary. The matter should 
not be too far removed from the employment relationship so that it can 
properly be said that it does not concern the employment relationship.
132 [2014] 9 BLLR 923 (LC). This is a departure from Rand Tyres and Accessories (Pty), Ltd. and 
Appel V Industrial Council for The Motor Industry (Transvaal), Minister for Labour, and Minister 
for Justice 1941 TPD 108. See M E Manamela 'Matters of Mutual Interest for Piuposes of a Strike' 
Obiter (2015) 791 and Grogan op cit (n44) 387 to 388.
‘33Para 17.
(2011) 7 BLLR 663 (LC).
See also Du Toit op cit (n69).
Grogan op cit (n69) 205.
[2014] 3 BLLR 217 (LAC). See J Van Wyk 'Employees Rights to Strike over issues of health and 
safety' accessed at http;//www.hrpulse.co.za/news/230618-employees-rights-to-strike-over-issues- 
of-health-and-safety on 19 May 2017.
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Matters that are purely socio-economic or political would generally not be 
matters of mutual interest. !l38
Caution should be exercised when distinguishing between disputes of right
and disputes of mutual interest as the courts have held the distinction is not
139watertight. The courts have held that 'the categorisation of [a] dispute as either
one of right or interest, [is] strictly speaking, not determinative... the legislature has
provided for an election to either engage in strike action or approach the appropriate
140forum to enforce the right.
Nevertheless, the Industrial Action Code*'** expressly distinguishes between 
disputes of right*'^^, disputes of mutual interest143 144and socio-economic disputes.
When making a determination a court is required to look at the true nature of the
138 Supra (nl37). See John Grogan 'Of Mutual Interest: When are strikes permissible* Employment 
Law Journal AugMSt (2014).
^^^MITUSA V TransnetLtd [2002] 11 BLLR 1023 (LAC).
Mawethu Civils (Pty) Limited v National Union ofMineworkers [2016] JOL 36070 (LAC).
'“‘'For a discussion regarding the draft version of the Industrial Action Code (which remain largely 
unchanged fi-om the final version) see PAK Le Roux 'The Code of Good Practice: Collective 
Bargaining and Picketing (Part Two)' (2017) 26(12) Contemporary Labour Law 130.
Defined in the Code, at s 17(l)(a), as 'a dispute that the Act or other employment laws require to be 
settled by arbitration or adjudication. An example of a dispute of right is a dispute arising from a 
contravention of a collective agreement or an employment law such as unfair dismissal, unfair 
discrimination, and imderpayment of wages. It can be described as a dispute concerning existing 
rights.'
Defined in the Code, at s 17(l)(b), as 'a dispute concerning employment or labour relations that 
cannot be resolved through enforcing existing rights. It can be described as a dispute to create new 
rights. A dispute of mutual interest is the legitimate scope of a collective bargaining agreement and 
the matters which may legitimately form the subject of a protected strike or lockout.'
While this may be the case, in practice there still remains a lack of clarity regarding what 
constitutes disputes of right and disputes of interest. This is compounded by the various uses of the 
term in the LRA. See Cheadle op cit (n6) 110 and Department of Home Affairs v Public Servants 
Association (2017) 38 lU 1555 (LC).
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dispute in order to determine whether it is a matter over which strike action may
145permissibly be taken.
There are two exceptions to the general principle that only matters of mutual
interest, and not disputes of right, may form the subject matter of strike action.
Certain disputes provide for an election to either judicially enforce a right or.
146alternatively, engage in strike action in an effort to obtain such right. They are
disputes in terms of s 189A of the LRA and organisational rights disputes.^'*’ Section
189A of the LRA regulates so-called large scale retrenchments. Section 189A (7)(a)
of the LRA provides for employees to have an election to refer the dispute either to 
the Labour Court or to strike over the dispute.Organisational rights disputes are
discussed in more detail below.
Peace / Functional to collective bargaining3.3
Introduction3.3.1
Coin Security Group (Pty) Ltd v Adams [2000] 4 BLLR 371 (LAC).
Cheadle op cit (n6) 109. The Industrial Action Code also provides, at s 17(4), that 'apart from the 
two exceptions relating to organisational rights and retrenchment in certain circumstances, the 
dispute must be one of mutual interest. Accordingly, rights disputes (other than the two 
exceptions) do not constitute matters that can form the subject matter of a protected strike or 
lockout.'
See ss 65(2)(a) and 64(2) of the LRA and s 17(3) of the Industrial Action Code.
Given the periods which must elapse within section 189A of the LRA before this right accrues it 
was held in NUMSA v Bell Equipment Co SA (Pty) Ltd (2011) 32 lU 382 (LC) that there was no 
need to approach the CCMA and obtain a certificate of outcome.
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A protected strike may lose its protected status in certain circumstances; for
instance, where the underlying dispute or grievance has been satisfactorily resolved.
However, in recent years, two court cases have suggested another possible, more
controversial, basis upon which strike action may be declared improtected, and
interdicted. The suggestion is that certain conduct perpetrated during the currency of
the strike, and in particular, violent conduct, may render the strike dysfunctional to
collective bargaining.
Uniquely, the cases in question deal widi the possibility of rendering an
otherwise protected strike unprotected even where the demand or grievance still 
persists. Due to its controversy as well as practical difficulties'^® that may arise in its
implementation alternative means of achieving the same result have been suggested 
including possibly reading limitations into file definition of'strike' action itself.'^'
These issues are addressed below.
Dysfunctional to collective bargaining3.3.2
In Tsogo Sun Casinos (Pty) Ltd t/a Montecasino v Future of SA Workers
Union,^^^ the Court held, by way of an obiter comment, as follows:
149 For a discussion on violent strike action and, in particular, the Marikana massacre see T 
Ngcukaitobi, 'Strike Law, Structural Violence and Inequality in the Platinum Hills of Marikana' 
(2013) 34 lU 836 and J Theron, S Godfrey, E and Fergus 'Organisational Rights and Collective 
Bargaining Rights through the Lens of Marikana' (2015) 36ILJ 849.
Rycroft op cit (nl28) 821.
A Myburg 'Interdicting Protected Strikes on Account of Violence' (2018) 39 /Z-/703.
(2012) 33 /ZJ998 (LC). [Hereafter 'Tsogo Sun'].
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'This court will always intervene to protect both the right to strike, and the right 
to peaceful picketing. This is an integral part of the court’s mandate, conferred 
by the Constitution and the LRA. But the exercise of the right to strike is sullied 
and ultimately eclipsed when those who purport to exercise it engage in acts of 
gratuitous violence in order to achieve their ends. When the tyranny of the 
mob displaces the peaceful exercise of economic pressure as the means to 
the end of the resolution of a labour dispute, one must question whether a 
strike continues to serve its purpose and thus whether it continues to enjoy 
protected status. tl53
In Tsogo Sun, a protected strike had resulted in violence and chaos. In its ruling,
the Court noted that the 'fact that the individual respondents are workers earning a
relatively low income is of no consequence. They have not denied participating in
the unlawful conduct alleged by the applicant, and they must bear the consequences
il54of their actions.
Tsogo Sun has since been endorsed, once again by way of an obiter comment,
in National Union of Food Beverage Wine Spirits and Allied Workers (NUFBWSAW)
V Universal Product Network (Pty) Ltd In re Universal Product Network (Pty) Ltd v 
National Union of Food Beverage Wine Spirits and Allied Workers}^^ In reaching its
decision the Court relied on two sources that a strike may lose its protection in
appropriate circumstances.^^®
153 Ibid para's 13 and 14. Emphasis added.
Ibid para 11.
[2016] 4 BLLR 408 (LC) [Hereafter 'UPW\. For a summary of the case see J Van Wyk and A van 
Heerden 'Can a strike be rendered unlawful as a result of unlawful acts including acts of violence?' 
accessed at http://www.werksmans.com/virt_e_bulletins/can-a-strike-be-rendered-unlawful-as-a- 
result-of-unlawful-acts-including-acts-of-violence/ on 20 May 2017.
E, Fergus 'Reflections on the (Dys)functionality of strikes to collective bargaining: Recent 
Developments (2016) 37 lU 1537 at 1547.
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First, the Court quoted Edelweiss Glass & Aluminium (Pty) Ltd v National
Union of Metalworkers of as authority for the proposition that a protected strike
may only be transmuted into an unprotected strike where 'the employees had used the
protected strike as leverage to achieve objectives other than those in respect of which
strike action could legitimately be taken.'^®®The Court seemed to suggest that the use
159of violence may meet this test.
Second, the Court considered the notion that violence may be non-functional to
collective bargaining. The Court held:
‘The proper approach, it would seem to me, is that proposed by Prof 
Rycrofl^®°...who acknowledges the practical difficulties that clearly arise, 
not least the determination of how much violence will misconduct would 
have to have occurred (sic) before the court intervenes. He suggests that the 
court ask the following question ‘Has misconduct taken place to an extent 
that the strike no longer promotes functional collective-bargaining, and is 
therefore no longer deserving of its protected status’? In answering this 
question, Prof Rycrofl proposes that the court weigh the levels of violence and 
efforts by the union concerned to curb it. He explains that this is not an anti­
union proposal; rather, he imagines a balancing counter-measure allowing 
unions to launch a similar court application for an order granting protected 
status to an otherwise unlawful strike if it is in response to unjustified conduct 
by the employer... In my view, this is an eminently sensible approach to adopt.’
161
157(2001) 32 /L/2939 (LAC).
See, however, Fergus op cit (nl56) 537 who critiques the relevance of Edelweiss in finding that an 
otherwise lawfiil strike should lose its protection due to strike action. For a counter-argument see 
Myburg op cit (nl51) 716.
'^®Supra (nl55) para 31.
Rycroft op cit (nl28) 821.
Supra (nl55) para 32. For an alternative formulation for an appropriate threshold for intervention 
see Myburg op cit (nl51) 721.
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Prof Alan Rycroft argues that, aside from the express requirements of ss 64 and
16265 of the LRA, there are a number of implicit restrictions on the right to strike. He
notes however that asserting that acts of misconduct or violence committed during a
strike are unprotected differs from suggesting that such acts open up a means to 
delegitimise the strike. Ordinarily, an employer would resort to an interdict to
prevent unlawful strike action, contempt of court proceedings where employees fail
to comply and dismissal proceedings as a means of maintaining control during a
violent strike. However, these mechanisms would have no effect on the protected
nature of the strike. It is in this respect that the Tsogo Sun and UPN cases are novel
and controversial in light of the entrenched constitutional right to strike.
Rycroft argues that while there is no express provision allowing for a strike to
be rendered unprotected in such circumstances, the courts may have an implicit 
power to declare a strike unprotected.^®'’ Relying on Tsogo Sun Rycroft argues that
violent action may be a legitimate reason to render an otherwise protected strike
unprotected.
The rationale is that 'the potential interdicting of strikes on account of
violence is not simply about violence per se. Instead, it is about the dynamic that
strike violence produces, and the impact it has on the collective bargaining
162 Rycroft op cit (nl28) 822 to 823. 
Ibid at 823.
Ibid at 826.
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il65 While the very purpose of a strike is to bring pressure to bear on the otherprocess.
il66party, sometimes, in the form of'hard bargaining. there may be limits to such
conduct. Where violence is used as a means of coercion Anton Myburgh argues that
'the strike is not a battle of attrition whose outcome is determined by the forces of
demand and supply, as it is designed to he.'*^’ Simply put, the law does not recognise
unlawful acts as a legitimate means of obtaining redress. As alluded to in UPN,
however, rendering an otherwise protected strike unprotected due to violence does
presents its own difficulties.
Violence and the definition of a strike3.3.3
Dr Emma Fergus clarifies the practical difficulties inherent^®* in the approach
endorsed by Rycrofl and the Tsogo Sun and C/PW cases. She argues that there is no
legislative or judicial authority to support the notion that functionality is a
requirement for collective bargaining 'least of all in the sense that they must accord
with the court's view of what is functional at any given time and in any given
il69industry. Rather, 'strikes-provided they are concerned with matters relevant to the
relationship between employers and employees - are by definition functional to
il70collective bargaining.
165 Myburg op cit (nl51) 705.
That hard bargaining is not equivalent to duress see Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bhamjee 
2005 (5) SA 339 (SCA) and Myburg op cit (nl51) 708.
Myburg op cit (nl51) 707.
As fully set out in Fergus op cit (nl56).
Ibid 1544.
™ Ibid 1539.
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While it is debatable to what extent the resort to violence as a method^'^^ of
securing legitimate demands is functional to collective bargaining, it is nonetheless
clear that, according to Fergus, there are clear practieal and legal difficulties with an
172approach focused on the functionality of collective bargaining. Practical
difficulties would include determining what threshold of violence is sufficient to
warrant intervention. Legal difficulties would include the possibility of striking
employees being prejudiced by the conduct of a minority. These difficulties may be
exploited by 'manipulation by imduly interventionist courts. '173
She goes on to say that 'the need to constrain the wanton levels of violence
which are sometimes associated with strikes in South Afiica cannot be
disputed,'^’"‘proposing tentatively that the right to strike be read as a right 'which may 
only be exercised peacefully.'*’^ For Myburgh, this requires the reading in of 
additional requirements into s 67 of the LRA or, rather, the reading of a limitation 
into the definition of what constitutes a 'strike.'*’^
171 As Myburgh notes the issue is the nature of the employees' conduct not the content of then- 
demand. See Myburg op cit (nl51) 714. See also 719 to 720 for a persuasive discussion on the 
extent to which violence cannot be divorced from the strike itself
Fergus op cit (nl56) 1546.
Ibid 1550.
Ibid 1545. For a discussion on recent strike statics, containing statistics on unprotected and violent 
strike action, see Cheadle op cit (n6) 31.
Fergus op cit (nl56) 1548.
Myburg op cit (nl51) 712.
172
173
174
175
176
47
Prof Peter Le Roux similarly suggests an amendment to the definition of
'strike' focusing on the 'act' element of the definition:
'Here an issue of terminology arises. The violence does not lead to a "strike" 
being rmprotected. It is submitted that it will, in most cases at least, be 
preferable to argue that the violence leads to the employees' action no longer 
being regarded as a strike, and therefore no longer being capable of enjoying 
the protection granted to strikes by section 67 of the [LRA]. This is because 
the form that the actions undertaken by or on behalf of the employees 
take is no longer a refusal to work or another action that falls within the 
definition of strike.'^^^
For Myburgh, there are three potential means by which a limitation into the
right to strike can be read. The first is by focusing on the notion of'unlawful
conduct.' So, for instance, if the 'means used by the workers to obstruct work.. .is
unlawful violence, then the conduct will not qualify as a strike, and will thus not be
il78protected. The second is by focusing on the argument put forward by Le Roux
that 'once violence replaces the refusal to work as the focal point of the strike, then it
no longer qualifies as a strike as defined, because violence is not part of the act 
element of the definition'*’^ of a strike. The third is to read in the term 'peaceful' into
the definition of'strike'. To the extent that the reading in of'peaceful' constitutes a
limitation on the right to strike Myburgh argues it would he justifiable in terms of s
36 of the Constitution.*^®
177 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
Ibid 716.
'™Ibid.
Ibid 717 to 719.
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However, Fergus also emphasises the necessary interplay between the
constitutional right to strike and other constitutional rights. She argues that 'absent
protection from harm, the constitutional rights of those who fall victim to strike 
violence to freedom and security of the person... are evidently infringed'**' during 
violent strike action. Where there is a balancing of rights the principle allowing the 
right to strike to trump other rights is often untenable.**^ The constitutional rights of
183non-participants are also expressly recognised by the Industrial Action Code.
The Amendment Act and Industrial Action Code3.3.3.4
Legislative amendments have recently been enacted to address the violent
nature of strikes in South Africa in the form of the Amendment Act**"* and the
Industrial Action Code.
The Amendment Act 'provides for a deadlock-breaking mechanism for
protracted and violent strikes, in the form of compulsory advisory arbitration
tl85undertaken by a statutory advisory panel. A director of the CCMA may^®® appoint
an advisory arbitration panel in the public interest to make an advisory arbitration
award (a) in order to facilitate a dispute on his / her own accord or in consultation
181 Fergus op cit (nl56) 1549.
Ibid 1549.
Op Cit (n4).
‘®''For a useful summary of the Amendment Act in its 'bill format' see PAK Le Roux 'The labour law 
amendment bills' (2017) 27(3) Contemporary Labour Law 2().
Myburg op cit (nl51) 722.
Emphasis added.
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with the parties, (b) after consultation in the prescribed manner with the parties to the
dispute and (c) in the prescribed manner setting out the panel's terms of reference as 
provided for.**"^ A director must appoint an advisory arbitration panel if:
(a) Subject to the below-mentioned requirements, he is directed to do so by the
Minister or on application by a party to the dispute;
(b) If ordered to do so by the Labour Court in the circumstances prescribed by
law;
(c) By agreement of the parties.
The aforementioned requirements are that the director has reasonable grounds to
.188believe that any one or more of the following circumstances exist:
(a) That the strike or lock-out is no longer functional to collective bargaining
because it has continued for a protracted period of time and no resolution of
the dispute appears to be imminent;
(b) There is a minimum threat that constitutional rights may be, or are being.
violated by persons participating in or supporting the strike or lock-out
through the threat or use of violence or the threat of, or damage to, property;
Section 150A (1) of the Amendment Act. 
Section 150A(3) of the Amendment Act.188
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(c) That the strike or lock-out causes, or has the imminent potential to cause or
exacerbate, an acute national or local crisis affecting the conditions for the
189normal social and economic ftinctioning of the community or society.
The above-mentioned grounds mirror the grounds discussed by Fergus and
Myburgh above. However, the Amendment Act does not allow for a strike to be
interrupted during an advisory arbitration. The strike cannot be interdicted.
Furthermore, a party is not bound by the arbitration award unless either the trade
union party to the dispute or the employer organisation party to the dispute have
accepted, or have been deemed to have accepted, the recommendation made in terms 
of the arbitration award.*®® The Amendment Act thus stops well short of the obiter
remarks in Tsogo Sun and which suggest protected strike action may be
rendered unprotected.
The provisions of the Amendment Act should be read in conjunction with the
provisions of the Industrial Action Code. The Industrial Action Code has been passed
in terms of s 203(1) of the LRA. Section 203(3) of the LRA expressly provides that
'any person interpreting or applying [the LRA] must take into account any relevant
code of practice', which includes the Industrial Action Code. While the Industrial
Action Code does not propose that strike action be suspended as a result of violent
conduct, it does throughout the collective bargaining process and right up until the
189 Sections 150A (3)(a) to (c) of the Amendment Act.
Section 150D, read with section 150C (5)(b), of the Amendment Act.190
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stage of industrial action place emphasis on mechanisms designed to avoid violence
and acrimony between the parties.*®* The Industrial Action Code emphasises that
192Strike action be peaceful. This is coupled with an obligation to engage in good
193faith bargaining.
It is unclear whether the emphasis on a strike being 'peaceful' creates any
substantive amendment to the law as existing prior to the enactment of the Industrial
Action Code. It has always been the case that acts of violence fall outside the 
purview of protection, and there is no suggestion in the Industrial Action Code that 
violent strike action will render an otherwise protected strike unprotected. There is
no suggestion, then, that the word 'peaceful' has been read into the definition of a
strike.
The introduction of a judicially enforceable obligation to bargain in 'good 
faith' is a novel addition to the law.*®^ Some of the examples of conduct conducive to
good faith bargaining, as contained in the Industrial Action Code, create obligations
I9I See for instance ss 2(1), 2(3), 2(4), 3(l)(d), 3(l)(e), 5(l)(e), 5(l)(f), (5(l)(g), 5(l)(h), 16(4) and 
23(1) of the Industrial Action Code.
See for instance ss 3(l)(d), 5(1), 22(2) and 23(1) of the Industrial Action Code.
See for instance ss 5(l)(e), 7, 18(3), Armexure A of the Industrial Action Code and s 8.3 of the 
Accord on Collective Bargaining and Industrial Action.
This will be discussed in more detail in chapter three below.
For a useful discussion on whether good faith bargaining should be introduced in South Africa see 
F Leppan et al "Bargaining in Bad Faith in South African Labour Law: An Antidote? Obiter (2016) 
474. There is nothing unusual about agreeing to good faith bargaining in a collective agreement. In 
fact, this is contemplated by the Industrial Action Code in that parties are advised to sign the 
model declaration in sched A to the Industrial Action Code wherein which the parties agree to 
bargain in good faith. Op cit (n44).
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in addition to that imposed by the LRA.*^^ Section 7 of the Industrial Action Code
has a number of commendable provisions aimed at facilitating healthy collective
bargaining, thereby avoiding situations that degenerate into industrial action; often of
a violent nature. However, to the extent that the Industrial Action Code offers the
courts the opportunity to judicially determine the merits of a dispute, which will be
the case where they have to determine whether parties are bargaining in good faith, it
has the potential to further inflame existing tensions between the parties.'^’ There is a
danger of 'negotiations descending into allegations and disputes as to whether either
or both parties are negotiating in bad faith.'^®®
While the Amendment Act does not expressly allow for a strike to be
interdicted for being violent Myburgh notes that:
'judges of the Labour Court may very well take the view that the thrust of the 
amendments to the LRA, the terms of the accord and the Draft Picketing 
Code, pave the way for a continuation of the interventionist approached 
adopted in UPN' case. Certainly, there can now be no debate about the fact 
that it is universally accepted by all concerned that strike violence is 
deplorable and must be brought under control. il99
Whether the courts will be inclined to do so caimot be determined as yet. The
extent to which the Amendment Act or Industrial Action Code will have a practical
effect on violent strike action is unclear. Many commentators have commented on
196 For instance, s 7(2), read with s 13(3), of the Industrial Action Code is an express departure from 
the provisions of s 16 of the LRA.
See s 7(8) of the Industrial Action Code for instance and Van Heerden Op Cit (n39).
PAK Le Roux'The Code of Good Practice: Collective Bargaining and Picketing' (2017) 26(11) 
Contemporary Labour Law 119 at 126.
Myburg op cit (nl51) 723.
197
198
199
53
the socio-economic considerations^®'’ (such as extreme poverty and discrepancy of 
wealth) which may have an adverse effect on any legal attempt to curtail such action.
Inequality and poverty can result in systems of structural violence where 'some social
structure purportedly harms people by preventing them from meeting their basic
needs.'^°^ Issues that are normally political and economic in nature, such as vast
inequality coupled with lack of service delivery, then impacts upon labour issues
resulting in a general lack of trust in the underlying social order.^o^ Until these issues
are rectified it may be the case that violent strikes persist despite the best legal efforts
to curtail such conduct.
^“Cheadle op cit (n6) chapter three. 
Ngcukaitobi op cit (nl49).
Ibid.
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4 Chapter three: The requirements of protected strike action
Introduction4.1
Broadly stated strike action is protected when it complies with the procedural
and substantive requirements of the LRA, as set out in ss 64 and 65 thereof. In
Ceramics Industries Ltd t/a Bettaware v NCBAWlf^^ the Court held that:
'broadly speaking...the [LRA] seeks to give effect to the fundamental right to 
strike by insulating participation in a protected strike from the legal 
consequences that might otherwise have followed in its wake. On the other 
hand, it regulates that right both procedurally and substantively. Procedurally 
it does so by requiring that certain formal requirements have to be met before 
protection follows. Substantively, it imposes limitations, one of which is to 
limit protected strikes to issues that are not arbitral or justiciable in terms of 
the [LRA].'204
Protected and unprotected strike action distinguished4.2
Before detailing the requisite procedural and substantive requirements of
protected strike action it is necessary to elaborate on the importance on the 
distinction between protected and unprotected strike action in the first place.^®^ Why
it is crucial is because of the certain types of protection afforded to employees
participating in protected strike action and not unprotected strike action which are:
203 1997 6 BLLR 697 (LAC) [hereafter 'Ceramics']. Du Toil op cit (n69).
Supra (ii203) page 700.
“’For a comprehensive discussion of the consequences see T Cohen and R Le Roux 'Liability, 
Sanctions and other Consequences of Strike Action' in B Hepple et al Laws against Strikes: The 
South African Experience in an International and Comparative Perspective (2016) JUTA at 126 to 
139.
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206Preventing the strike being interdicted4.2.1
Where an unprotected strike commences, it is often the case that an
employer's initial reaction is to bring the strike action to an end via an urgent
interdict.^®^
Section 68(1) of the LRA allows an employer, in such circumstances, to
approach the courts with a request to 'grant an interdict or order to restrain.. .any
i208person from participating in a strike or in contemplation or furtherance of a strike.
An interdict can be obtained to prevent employees from engaging in continued
unprotected strike action.^®® This course of action is not available where the strike is
protected.
Where any person fails to adhere to the terms of a court order they may be
210held in contempt of court under certain circumstances. The interdict is enforceable
against any employees engaged in unprotected strike action, as well as their union(s).
206 For a usefiil article on strike interdicts, especially in the context of strike violence, see PAK Le 
Roux 'Strike Interdicts: Dealing with violence and unlawful demands' (2015) 25(5) Contemporary 
Labour Law 52 and Cheadle op cit (n6) 111.
As per s 158 of the LRA.
See for instance PRASA t/a Metrorail v SATAWU (case no 190/2016) 12 May 2016 [hereafter 
'PRASA'\.
It can also be used to prevent employees fi-om engaging in acts of misconduct.
Ibid. For a useful article on contempt of court procedures see PAK Le Roux 'Contempt of Court in 
the context of strike violence' (2014) 23(12) Contemporary Labour Law 109 and Cheadle op cit 
(n6) 113 to 117.
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211Protection against disciplinary action4.2.2
As discussed earlier, the common law was initially repressive of strike action.
By engaging in strike action, employees were considered to have breached their
contract of employment and committed misconduct. Any employee engaging in
strike aetion would thus face disciplinary action including dismissal. This stringent
approach was relaxed, in part, under the auspices of the Industrial Court, which
regarded it as 'unfair to dismiss illegally striking workers if the object of the strike
i212was considered to be legitimate.
Section 67(2) of the LRA provides that 'a person does not commit a.. .breach
of contract by taking part in a (a) protected strike.. .or (b) any conduct in
contemplation or fijrtherance of a protected strike.' This would include a breach of a
contract of employment; as well as any duties and obligations, whether written or
implied, contained therein or arising by virtue of the employment relationship.
Section 67(4) expressly provides that 'an employer may not dismiss an employee for
partieipating in protected strike action or for any conduct in contemplation of or in
furtherance of a protected strike.' This does not, however, extend to separate acts of 
misconduct committed during the course of a protected strike.^*^
211 This issue is dealt with briefly herein. For a comprehensive discussion see Cheadle op cit (n6) 193 
to 217.
2*2 Ibid at 209.
213 Section 67(5) of the LRA.
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Section 68(5) of the LRA provides that 'participation in a strike that does not
comply with the provisions [of the LRA].. .may constitute a fair reason for
dismissal.'^^'* In determining whether or not the dismissal is fair, the Code of Good
Practice: Dismissal in Sched 8 must be taken into account.^* ^
Employees engaging in unprotected strike action thus face the risk of
disciplinary action, including dismissal. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the
'unprotected nature of the strike 'is not a magic wand' that renders the dismissal of the
strikers automatically unfair, and the onus remains on the employer to establish
t216substantive and procedural fairness.
217Compensation4.2.3
Section 67(6) of the LRA provides that 'civil legal proceedings may not be
instituted against any person for (a) participating in a protected strike.. .or (b) any
conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a protected strike.' Section 67(8) of the
LRA makes it clear that this protection does not extend to any acts that constitute an
offence.
214 Emphasis added.
Section 68(5) of the LRA. In other words, the dismissal must be substantively and procedurally feir 
in terms of the LRA.
Cheadle op cit (n6) 209.
^'^For a useful article on contempt proceedings see PAK Le Roux 'Claims for compensation arising 
from strike and lockouts' (2013) 23(2) Contemporary Labour Law 11 zeoAPRASA supra (n208).
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In terms of s 68(l)(b) of the LRA, a court may order the payment of just and
equitable compensation to an employer for any loss attributable to unprotected strike 
action.^^® There is no guarantee of such an order being granted but compensation 
awards have been made where the circumstances so justify.^*^ Employees who
engage in unprotected strike action run the risk of having to pay compensation.
4.2.4 Delictual damages
In addition to compensation, a court may order delictual damages against a
trade union or its members where the strike is unprotected. A 'delict is broadly
tii220defined as "wrongful and blameworthy conduct which causes harm to a person.
Section 67(2) of the LRA provides that 'a person does not commit a.. .delict
by taking part in a (a) protected strike.. .or (b) any conduct in contemplation or
Section 68(b) of the LRA set out the factors a court will have regard to when awarding just and 
equitable compensation. The court will consider::
(a) Whether -
Attempts were made to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV of the LRA and 
the extent of those attempts;
The strike or conduct was premeditated;
The strike was in response to unjustified conduct by another party to the dispute; 
There was compliance with an order granted to interdict the unprotected strike 
The interests of orderly collective bargaining;
The duration of the strike or conduct;
The financial position of the employer, trade union or employees respectively.
See Algoa Bus Company (Pty) Ltd v Transport Action Retail and General Workers Union (Thor 
Targwu) [2015] 9 BLLR 952 (LC) and Cheadle op cit (n6) 118. It is important that parties set out 
sufficient detail to substantiate the damages sought.
Cheadle op cit (n6) 119.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(b)
(c)
(d)
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furtherance of a protected strike.' Section 67(8) of the LRA makes it clear that this
protection does not extend to any acts that constitute an offence.
Procedural requirements4.3
Section 64 of the LRA provides that in order for a strike to be protected, the
following conditions must be met;
(a) The issue in dispute must have been referred to the CCMA and either the
CCMA has issued a certificate of outcome declaring the dispute unresolved
or a period of 30 days has elapsed since the referral of the dispute was
received by the CCMA;^^' and
(b) No less than 48 hours' notice of the strike must be given by the
employees/trade union to the employer (or bargaining council or employers' 
organisation as the case may be)^^^or seven days' notice in the case of the
223state.
221 Sections 64(1 (a)(i) and (ii) of die LRA. 
Section 64(b) of the LRA.
Section 64(d) of the LRA.
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If the issue pertains to a refusal to bargain then it is also mandatory that an
224advisory award is obtained. The above requirements need not be compiled with
where:
(a) The parties are members of a bargaining council and the bargaining council's
procedures have been adhered to;
(b) The strike conforms with the procedures set out in a collective agreement; or
225(c) The strike is in response to an unlawful lock-out initiated by the employer.
While the procedural requirements appear, at first glance, relatively
straightforward there has been, over the course of a number of years, significant
litigation over the various procedural requirements and what, exactly, they require in
order to be met. As a result, significant content and clarification has been provided
setting out the various procedural requirements that must be adhered to. The
Industrial Action Code has also sought to clarify aspects of these requirements. The
requirements are as follows:
4.3.1 Referral / certificate of outcome or expiration of 30 day period
224 Section 64(2), read in conjunction with section 135(3)(c), of the LRA. 
Sections 64(3)(a) to (c) of the LRA.225
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The initial requirement is that the issue in dispute must have been referred to
the CCMA, or an appropriate bargaining council certified to resolve disputes, for
conciliation and either a certificate of outcome has been issued recording that the
226dispute remains unresolved or a period of 30 days has elapsed since the referral.
Section 213 of the LRA defines 'issue in dispute' as 'the demand, the
grievance or the dispute that forms the subject matter of the strike.' Thus there must
be a dispute present before a referral can be made. A dispute suggests that the
employer is aware of the dispute and has failed to agree to the demand forming the
227subject matter of the dispute.
The dispute concerned may be referred to the CCMA by either the employer
or employee.^^* Section 64(1 )(a) of the LRA does not require that a particular party
refer the dispute in order to commence strike action. Where the employer refers a
dispute to the CCMA and it remains unresolved, then the union may strike over the
229issue(s) in dispute. It is insufficient to simply notify a coimcil there is a dispute
and then seek no assistance from them. This would not constitute a legitimate 
referral.^^® It is required that the nature of the dispute be set out in the referral.
226 Section 64(l)(a) of the LRA.
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v SAMWU (2008) 29 lU 650 (LC). 
Cheadle op cit (n6) 58.
Columbus Joint Venture v NUMSA [1997] 10 BLLR 1292 (LC). Du Toit op cit (n69).
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However, a 'lack of detail in the referral and / or certificate of outcome is also
i231acceptable, as long as the substance of the dispute is addressed at conciliation.
The purpose of conciliation is to assist the parties to the dispute to reach a
mutually acceptable solution without the need to resort to industrial action which is
always regarded as a means of last resort. Any attempt to resolve a dispute at
conciliation must be genuine. In the case of Betafence v South Africa (Pty) Ltd v
NUMSA^^^ the Court held:
'the conciliation process within the context of mutual interest disputes should 
not be seen as a mere obligatory charade and a licence to industrial action. 
The CCMA or Bargaining Councils were not meant to be mere vending 
machines expected to dispense of certificates of outcome on demand. The 
parties prior to embarking on any form of industrial action, must have 
through the assistance of conciliators/mediators, embarked on a genuine 
process of conciliation, or at the very least, made some concerted effort in 
that regard'233
This has been confirmed by the Industrial Action Code which states that "the
Ii234parties must in good faith endeavour to settle the dispute.
A union or employees carmot commence with industrial action and then raise 
new demands^^^ that have not been subjected to conciliation. The courts will look at
231 Cheadle op cit (n6) 57. See also Defy Appliances (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA [2001] 12 BLLR 1328 (LC). 
[2016] ZALCCT 33 (15 September 2016).
Ibid para 19.
Section 18(3) of the Industrial Action Code.
See FGWU and Others v Minister of Safety and Security [1999] 4 BLLR 332 (LC) [hereafter 
'FGWU case], Halton op cit (n6) 57 and Grogan op cit (n44) 413. See also s 7(4) of the Industrial 
Action Code which records one of the principles of good faith bargaining as a restriction on parties
232
233
234
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the true nature of the dispute where there is a question about the real reason for the 
strike.^^'^ The Industrial Action Code states that the secondary object of conciliation
237is to record the parties' demands. Should the dispute remain unresolved, then this
requirement proves useful in practice. It limits the potential for a debate as to
whether new demands have been introduced or not and it makes eminent sense,
given the purpose served by the conciliation phase, that a union is barred from 
engaging in strike action until the certificate is actually issued^^® or the 30 day 
period^^^ has expired whichever occurs first.240
In Lesedi Local Municipality v SAMWlfi^^ the Court held that a bargaining
242council. is not authorised to make a determination as to whether a strike is
protected or not. Rather, the appropriate forum to determine whether a strike is 
protected or not is the Labour Court.^^^ One exception to this principle is the
requirement that an advisory arbitration award is obtained in terms of s 64(2), read
with s 135(3)(c), of the LRA before a strike can commence
introducing new demands during negotiations xmless it's to settle the matter and even then only 
with the agreement of the other party.
Platinum Mile Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Transition Transport v SATAJVU (2010) 31 ILJ 2037 
(LAC). See Cheadle op cit (n6) 57.
Section 18(4) of the Industrial Action Code.
238 SATAWUv Natro Freight (Pty) Ltd [2006] 8 BLLR 749 (LC).
289 Or such longer period as may be agreed between the parties.
Supra (n227). Eskom v NUMSA [2002] 12 BLLR 1153 (LAC).
[2007] 1 BLLR 55 (LC). Du Toit op cit (n74).
By inference the CCMA as well.
Cape Gate (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA [1997] 6 BLLR 767 (LC). Du Toit op cit (n69).
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Notice of intention to engage in strike action4.3.2
Required notice period4.3.2.1
Once a certificate of outcome has been obtained or the 30 day period has
expired, notice of the strike must be given by the employees to the employer.
244Ordinarily, 48 hours' notice is required. However, where notice must be provided
245to the state, seven days' notice is stipulated, 
subject matter of City ofMatlosana v SALGBC}*^ The Court held that 'the "State
Who constitutes the 'State' was the
was not limited to national and provincial government but that the term covered the
State in all its manifestations, including bodies such as the regional service council
and transitional metropolitan councils.The Court held that:
'Another consideration for the seven-day notice is its rationale. One of the 
reasons for giving notice is that the State provides essential and necessary 
services to the public..., such services are rendered at national, provincial and 
local levels. No alternative provider of many components of such services is 
readily available, especially to poor communities. There is, therefore, a 
rational basis for requiring seven days' notice for strikes in all three tiers of 
government. '248
244 Section 64(1 )(b) of the LRA.
Section 64(l)(d) of the LRA.
[2009] JOL 23154 (LC) [herafter 'City ofMatlosana'].
PAK Le Roux 'Strikes - procedural issues' (2009) 19(4) Contemporary Labour Law at 32. In so 
holding the Court was relying on the judgment of Greater Johannesburg Transitional 
Metropolitan Council v Eskom 2000 (1) SA 866 (SCA),
Para 7.
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The requirement to provide notice is not, however, without debate as to its
practical requirements. A number of judgments have clarified the standards that must
be met when providing such notice.
In Moloto the Constitutional Court^'^^ held that there is no requirement for
employees to provide any further information than the time of the commencement of
250the strike such as who, exactly, will engage in strike action. The Court further held
that:
'To require more information than the time of its commencement in the strike 
notice fi’om employees, in order to strengthen the position of the employer, 
would run counter to the underlying purpose of the ri^t to strike in our 
Constitution - to level the playing fields of economic and social power 
already generally tilted in favour of employers.
The Court in Ceramics,held that the union should provide an exact time
when the strike would commence, relying on a purposive approach to s 64(b) of the
LRA. The Court held that:
'The provisions of section 64(1 )(b) need to be interpreted and applied in a 
manner which gives best effect to the primary objects of the Act and its own 
specific purpose.. .One of the primary objects of the Act is to promote orderly 
collective bargaining...The section’s specific purpose is to give an employer 
advance warning of the proposed strike so that an employer may prepare for the 
power play that will follow. That specific purpose is defeated if the employer is
249 Supra (n90).See Cheadle op cit (n6) 59 and Du Toit op cit (n69).
The Industrial Action Code makes it clear in s 20(4) that a strike notice need not provide which 
employees are to go on strike.
251 Para 86.
Supra (n203).252
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not informed in the written notice in exact terms when the proposed strike will 
eommence. i253
The Court accordingly held that the failure to provide a specific date upon
which the strike would commence would defeat this objective.^^'* The purposive
approach adopted in the Ceramics case is consistent with that of the City of
Matlosana case.
The Industrial Action Code states that a strike notice must contain the date and
time when the strike is to commence as well as the demands which the other party is
255being required to meet.
In addition, the Industrial Action Code recommends that 'parties should agree to
a notice period, notwithstanding the minimum periods set out in the [LRA], that is of
sufficient duration to allow the employer to shut down its plant or services without
damage to property and to allow the employees to make the necessary arrangements
i256to face a period of no income. This provision goes further than the LRA and prior
253 Page 702. See also Fidelity Guards Holdings v Professional Transport Workers Union (1998) 19 
ILJ 260 (LC). See PAK Le Roux 'Giving employers notice of strike action’ (2012) 21(7) 
Contemporary Labour Law 62.
This is not to say that some judgments have not sought to soften the approach adopted in the 
Ceramics ease supra n203. In Western Platinum Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers (2000) 21 
lU 2502 (LC) the union said the strike would commence on or before 15h00. This was found to 
be acceptable. In Country Fair Foods (a division of Astral Operations Ltd) v Hotel Liquor 
Catering Commercial & Allied Workers Union [2006] 5 BLLR 478 (LC) the Court held that it was 
only necessary to give the day on which the strike would commence and not the hour. In this 
instance, the strike notice was provided 13 days in advanee. To require a specific time in some 
circumstances would be overly formulistic. Rather, the fundamental determination was whether 
the employer and had been given adequate warning of the strike and had sufficient time to mitigate 
the risks incumbent upon its business as a result of the strike action. Du Toit op cit (n69).
Section 20(3) of the Industrial Action Code.
Section 20 of the Industrial Act Code.256
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judicial decisions. There is presently no obligation for parties to agree to a longer
period. It remains to be seen how courts will interpret this provision. The extent to
which the inclusion of the peremptory statement that parties 'should' agree to
extended periods may prove fertile ground for litigation.
In circumstances where a strike is suspended and then recommences, there is 
no need to issue a new strike notice.^^^ The courts have also held that providing
notice to an employer outside of working hours may be problematic. In the case of 
SA Airways (Pty) Ltd v SATA the Court held, by way of an obiter remark, that:
'It seems to me that the giving of notice may well be improper, and the strike 
notice accordingly deficient, where the person giving notice is aware that the 
intended recipient is unlikely to receive it within a reasonable time.'^^®
4.3.2.2. Commencement of the strike
260It has been held, in Tiger Wheels that a strike need not commence on the
day provided for in the notice. Where a strike commenced three days after the date
specified in the notice, the employees could not be said to have waived their right to
commence strike action. The Court held that 'though the notice is intended to give
the employer an opportunity to prepare for the approaching power-play, this did not
mean that the non-commencement of the strike on the specified day would
257 Transportation Motor Spares vNUMSA [1999] 1 BLLR 78 (LC). There are, however, limits to this 
principle as further discussed below in PRASA supra (n208).
(2010) 31 lU 1219 (LC). Du Toit op cit (n69).
Para 24.
See Cheadle op cit (n6) 59.
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.261necessarily defeat the purpose of the notice. Whether or not the employees
intended to waive their right to strike must be determined based on the particular
facts.
Bradley Conradie notes that 'this decision must be seen in light of the
relatively short period that elapsed between the date specified in the notice and the
day when the strike commenced. An unreasonable delay, Zondo J suggested in a
.262minority judgment, might well result in the loss of the right to strike.
The Industrial Action Code now provides that
'if a strike or lockout does not commence on the date stated in the notice, the 
trade union or employers' organisation should issue a further notice stating 
the date and time of commencement if it intends to strike or lockout unless 
there is an agreement, that should not be unreasonably withheld, to extend or 
shorten the notice to allow for further negotiations. .263
The Industrial Action Code states that a failure to issue a new notice may 
give rise to an inference that the strike has been waived or abandoned. The
mention of this inference has the potential to result in significant litigation in that an
employer may view any delay as a waiver of the right to strike by the employees or
the trade union concerned and seek to interdict the strike on this basis. It is likely,
261 Cheadle op cit (n6) 59 footnote 105. For a critique of this position see Le Roux op cit (n253).
^“Ibid. The reference to 'Zondo J' is a reference to the honourable Judges judgment in the Tiger 
Wheels case supra (n84).
Section 20(5) of the Industrial Action Code.
Section 20(6) of the Industrial Action Code provides that 'the &ilure to issue a ftirther notice, or 
strike or lockout after a notice is issued in terms of 19(5) herein, may lead to an inference that the 
trade union or employers’ organisation has waived or abandoned its right to strike or lockout.'
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based on existing jurisprudence, that the courts would be reluctant to readily find a
waiver to have taken place especially in the instance of a short delay and in light of
the fact that the discretion of whether to find whether a waiver has occurred
ultimately remains, by virtue of the inclusion of 'may' as opposed to 'must' in the
Industrial Action Code, wilii the courts.
The question arises as to whether strike action may be rendered improtected
where there is a substantial delay between the issuing of the certificate of outcome
265and the strike notice. In PRASA, the Court had to consider whether strike action
embarked upon by SATAWU, one of the unions active at the employer, PRASA's,
workplace was protected or not.
SATAWU had referred a dispute regarding a number of issues to the CCMA.
A certificate of outcome confirming that the matter was unresolved was subsequently
issued, after which the imion elected to engage in fiarther discussions with PRASA.
These discussions took place on a regional and national level.
Although discussions regarding the subject matter of the certificate continued
at national level, the union's Western Cape regional office elected to issue a notice of
intention to engage in strike action some 18 months after the certificate of outcome
265 Supra (ii208). See J Van Wyk, J and A van Heerden 'Striking in support of a demand for 
organisational rights in a workplace outside the scope of a trade union's constitution' accessed at 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/striking-in-support-of-a-demand-fororganisational-rights-in-a- 
workplace-outside-the-scope-of-a-trade-unions-constitution-2015-01-06 on 17 May 2017 which 
contains a useful summary of the case and the legal principles applicable thereto.
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was obtained. PRASA then approached the Labour Court arguing that the strike was
unprotected.
An interim order was issued with a finding that the strike was unprotected.
On the return date, the Court had to consider whether S ATAWU could be said to
have waived, estopped or abandoned their right to strike in issuing the notice 18
months after the certificate of outcome. In reaching its ruling the Court gave
consideration to the ruling of Public Servants Association of SA v Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Developmen'^^ which, in turn, made reference to Western
267Platinum Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers which held that:
'Taking all of the above into consideration I am not satisfied that the notice 
given by the respondents in terms of s 64(1 )(b) [of the LRA] was given 
witiiin a reasonable time and as such the certificate upon which the notice 
was based has become stale by effluxion of time.'^®®
In the Public Servants' case. Judge Landman held that 'if [the Court] meant to
[hold] that it was permissible to rely merely on the effluxion of time then I would
respectfully disagree with him.'^^^ In so finding, the Court endorsed the view that
there must be a waiver, abandonment or estoppel present in order to render the strike
266 (2001) 22 /L/2303 (LC) [hereafter 'Public Servants’
(2000) 21 /ZJ 2502 (LC). Which, in turn, endorses Free State Consolidated Gold Mines 1988 (2) 
SA 425(0).
PRASA supra (n208) para's 52 and 53.
Supra (n266) para 55.
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xmprotected. It was this ruling that the Court in PRASA^^^ disagreed and departed
from.
Rather, the Court in PRASA held that:
'The inquiry should not centre on a waiver of the right to strike. Rather, it is a 
failure to rely on a specific certificate of outcome that is discernible in a case 
such as that before [the Court].. .the right to strike is retained, but after an 
unreasonable delay in acting on the issuing of a certificate, a union is required 
to go through the procedural steps set out in section 64 of the LRA once 
more. This approach accords with the speedy resolution of disputes on which 
the LRA is premised. It is also imminently sensible: over a period of 18 
months there are likely to have been changes in the collective bargaining 
relationship. The procedural requirements clothing strike action with 
protection, which includes the opportunity for parties to reach a settlement 
agreement through the conciliation process, may produce a different outcome, 
given the effluxion of time.'^^^
It is argued that this ruling is consistent with the purposive approach adopted
by the Ceramics case and is correct. It will have to be determined on the facts
whether an unreasonable delay has been occasioned in any particular instance.
To whom must notice be provided and by whom4.3.2.3
Normally, notice must be provided to the employer. However where the
dispute pertains to agreements concluded in a bargaining council, then notice need
only be provided to such council, provided the employer is a member of the
270 PRASA supra (n208). 
Ibid Para 8.271
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council.^^^ The purpose of this requirement is practical. An employers' duly
authorised representative is dealt with to avoid having to provide notice to all the
273employers who fall within the scope of the bargaining council. The notice must be
274provided by an authorised member of the union calling the strike.
Similarly, if the 'employer is a member of an employers' organisation that is a
party to a dispute, notice of the strike must be given to the employers' organisation
i275and.. .need not be given to the employer.
4.3.2.4 To whom does the notice apply
In Afrox Ltd V SACCA the Court found that the strike notice applies to 
all of the unions' members and not just die members of the union who were part of 
the referral to the CCMA. In addition, once a dispute is conciliated, other employees
who do not have an interest in the matter may also strike in support of their
colleagues. For example, where a particular bargaining unit is in dispute with the
employer, non-bargaining members can also participate in the strike without die need
272 Cheadle op cit (n6) 58, Tiger Wheels case supra (n84) and Plastics Converters Association ofSA v 
Association of Electric Cable Manufacturers o/[2011] 11 BLLR 1095 (LC). Where the employer 
is a not a member of the council then the notice will be insufficient in so far as such employer is 
concerned. See SA Airways (Pty) Ltd v SATA WU (2006) 27ILJ1034 (LC).
Cheadle op cit (n6) 58.
Grogan op cit (44) 414.
Cheadle op cit (n6) 59.
Supra (nl27).
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277for a separate strike notice to be obtained and provided to the employer concerned.
In Moloto,^^^ the Court extended this approach by finding that non-unionised
employees need not provide separate notices.^^® In Plastics Converters Association of
280SA V Association of Electric Cable Manufacturers of SA, the Court found that
where a dispute had been referred by a party to a bargaining council, then the
employees falling within the registered scope of the council need not obtain separate
notices even if they are not members of the bargaining council.
The content of the notice4.3.2.5
It is a requirement that a notice clearly articulate all of the union's demands. In
SA Airways (Pty) Ltd v SATAWUf^^ the Court held that:
'The same purposive approach adopted by the Labour Appeal Court requires 
that a strike notice should sufficiently clearly articulate &e union’s demands 
so as to place the employee in a position where it can take an informed 
decision to resist or exceed to those demands. In other words, the employer 
must be in a position to know with some degree of precision which demands 
a union and its members intend pursuing through strike action, and what is 
required of it to meet those demands.. .Any employer faced with a strike 
notice issued in such imprecise terms would be hard pressed to know which 
element of what grievance and petition it was being asked to resist or 
concede.
277 Supra (ii90) and Cheadle op cit (n6) 60. In reaching its ruling the Court relied on the reasoning set 
out in Ceramics supra (n203). See in this regard para's 26 to 28 of the Court's judgment. The 
Industrial Action Code provides that the notice does not have to include the ^vision of the 
employer's worlqjlace in which the strike is going to occur.
Supra (n90). For a comprehensive discussion of this case see Brenda Grant et al 'Who needs to 
notify the employer of impending strike action? A discussion of SA Transport & Allied Workers 
Union v Moloto and Another 2012 (6) SA 249 (CC)' 71/37(1) 62.
Section 21(1) of the Industrial Action Code confirms this. VanNiekerk op cit (n29) 428.
Supra (n272).
[2010] 3 BLLR 321 (LC). Cheadle op cit (n6) 61.
Para 27. See also supra (n90) para 91.
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It has been held that where the employer shows by its conduct that it is aware 
of the union's demand then the notice is sufficient.^®^ Section 20(3) of the Industrial
Action code reiterates the point that the strike notice must contain the demands the
other party is to meet.
284In Edelweiss Glass and Aluminum (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA, the Court held that
the parties are entitled to raise new issues during the course of the strike as a means
of resolving the dispute. The Court held that:
'Critical to the dispute resolution structure of the [LRA] is the encouragement 
of the resolution of disputes by agreement. It would be completely unrealistic 
in the context of a strike, to insist that in any engagement that is aimed at 
resolving the strike the parties are limited to pressing only those demands that 
have specifically been formulated in the run-up to the strike. The parties are 
entitled to adopt a much broader problem-solving approach to resolving a 
collective bargaining dispute. This may include introducing proposals or 
issues that have not even been thought of, let alone presented at the 
bargaining table, if this might leave to breaking the deadlock that exists.. .this 
of course does not mean that a trade union may seek to use a protected strike 
as leverage to achieve other objectives in respect of which no strike action 
could be taken.'2®5
As Le Roux notes, the purpose of this approach is to facilitate the resolution
of disputes. The idea is that the demand is raised in the interests of resolving the
286matter, not to compel the acceptance of a new demand. So while a notice must still
be clearly articulated, it does not mean that new demands cannot subsequently be
283 UPNSupra (nl55).
[2012] 1 BLLR 10 (LAC). 
Para's 71 to 73.
Le Roux op cit (ii247) 64.
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added subject to the caveat expressed above. The Industrial Action Code confirms
that a notice must contain demands that are no different than those demands upon
which the parties deadlocked. However, the Industrial Action Code also provides that
new demands can be raised during negotiations where this forms part of an effort to 
resolve matters.^*’ There is no reason to think this approach is limited once industrial
action is already underway and this is consistent with the jurisprudence discussed
above.
4.3.2.6 Timelimit
In Public Association SA v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Developmentf^^ the Court held that it is not a requirement that a time limit be placed 
on the strike.^*^ The Court held that:
'The LRA does not compel strikers to put a limit on the duration of their 
strike, or if they should do so, it does not compel them to disclose this 
information. It is inherent in the nature of a strike that it is a power play 
where new economic forces determine which party will yield, either by 
capitulating or making an acceptable offer. It is this uncertainty about the 
duration of the strike which adds to the effectiveness of the strike and the 
goal of collective bargaining. 1290
Advisory arbitration award4.3.3
287 Section 7(4).
[2001] 11 BLLR 1250 (LC). 
Cheadle op cit (n6) 59.
290 Para 71.
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Section 64(2) of the LRA provides that 'if the issue in dispute concerns a
refusal to bargain an advisory award, must have been made in terms of s 135(l)(c)
of the LRA before notice of intention to engage in strike action may be given.'
Section 64(2)(c) of the LRA lists the following issues which would constitute a
.291refusal to bargain;
(a) A refusal to recognise a trade union as a collective bargaining agent or to
.292agree to establish a bargaining council;
.293(b) A withdrawal of recognition of a collective bargaining agent;
(c) A resignation of a party from a bargaining cotmcil;
(d) A dispute about appropriate bargaining units, appropriate bargaining levels or
294bargaining subjects.
Section 135(l)(c) of the LRA provides that 'the [CCMA] must determine a
process to attempt to resolve a dispute, which may include making a
recommendation to the parties, which may be in the form of an advisory arbitration
award.' Read in the context of s 64(2) of the LRA, the discretionary 'may* must be
295read as 'must' when dealing with refusal to bargain issues.
See W A Joubert et al 'The Law of South Africa'hsA (2018) vol 24(1) LexisNexis, Durban at 346. 
See Natal Sharks Board vSACCAWU[\991] 8 BLLR 1032 (LC).
See County Fair Foods v Hotel Liquor Catering Commercial & Allied Workers Union [2006] 5 
BLLR 478 (LC).
294 NUMSA V Transnet SOC 2016 lU 638 (LAC).
Cheadle op cit (n6) 61.
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While the parties need not adhere to the terms of the advisory arbitration
award, which is non-binding, in order to engage in strike action they are, nonetheless, 
obliged to first receive the award and serve it on the other party^^^ before engaging in 
such action.^^’ In FGWU,^^^ the Court held that just because;
'the commissioner in this case delayed issuing the advisory award until 
prompted to do so by the fifth respondent [it] did not relieve the applicants of 
their obligation to comply with the peremptory provisions of section 64(2) [of 
the LRA], Nor does the fact that the advisory award happened to be issued 
after the applicants served their notice on the fifth respondent, but before they 
commenced the strike, serve to condone their non-compliance with section 
64(2). The purpose of section 64(2) is clearly to compel the parties seriously 
to consider the advisory award before deciding whether to strike. This 
purpose would be fhistrated if employees could give notice of their intention 
to strike before receiving an advisory award. i299
Even where a commissioner refuses to issue an advisory award, it has been
found that the union or employees are barred fi’om engaging in industrial action.
300Rather, their recourse is to approach another commissioner to obtain an award.
4.4 Exceptions to procedural requirements
Conformity with the procedure contained in a collective agreement^®*4.4.1
^^Supra (n236) and Du Toit op cit (n69).
Ibid. FGWUsupra (n235). CEPPWAWUv CPTLtd [2013] 4 BLLR 378 (LC). For a discussion on 
the 'potential' of obtaining advisory arbitration awards see Neil Coetzer 'The Road Less Travelled: 
Unlocking the Potential of Advisory Arbitration Awards' (2014) 35 lU 880.
Supra (n235). Du Toit op cit (n69).
Para 31.
300 jvEIW V MIBCO [2002] 1 BLLR 62 (LC).
Section 64(3)(b) of the LRA.
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The LRA, in accordance with the purpose of self-governance and voluntarism
in the regulation of industrial policy,allows parties, by way of a collective
agreement, to regulate which procedure must be adhered to when embarking upon
protected strike action.
It has been held that a party who complies with the mutually agreed upon
procedures contained in a collective agreement, need not also adhere to the
303provisions contained within the LRA. However, a party may elect to forego the
procedures contained in the collective agreement, provided they comply with the
304 305procedure provided for in the LRA. In County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltdv FA WU,
the Court held that:
'What the legislature has sought to achieve is to give parties a choice of either 
following a pre-strike dispute procedure contained in a collective agreement 
or following the statutory procedure in section 64(1). Compliance with either 
procedure suffices to confer on employees the right to strike and the resultant 
strike acquires the status of a protected strike with all the benefits and 
consequences which flow from such status. ii306
See section 1(c) of the LRA and Cheadle op cit (n6) 62.
North East Cape Forests v SAAPA WU (2) [1997] 6 BLLR (LAC) and Cheadle op cit (n6) 62.
Columbus Joint Venture v NUMSA [1997] 10 BLLR 1292 (LC) and BMW South Africa (Pty) Ltd v 
NUMSA obo Members [2012] 3 BLLR 274 (LAC). In the latter case Waglay DJP voices his 
disagreement with this approach when stating, at para 9 of the judgment, that 'the respondent on 
the other hand argues that it is not obliged to comply with the procedure set out in clause 8.3 
because its demand is one of mutual interest and it is entitled to embark on a strike in support of its 
demand as long as it does so in compliance with the provisions of the Laboiu Relations Act no 66 
of 1995 (as amended) (the Act).' I disagree. Where parties have concluded an agreement which 
does not deny any of the parties to the agreement the rights and obligations provided in the Act, I 
see no reason why that agreement cannot be enforced.'
[2001] 5 BLLR 494 (LAC) [hereafter 'Country Fair Foods'\ Du Toit op cit (n69).
Para 20.
303
304
305
306
79
4.4.2 Disputes dealt with by a bargaining council in accordance with its
constitution^®’
Similarly, bargaining councils are also provided with latitude to regulate their
own procedures. Where a bargaining council deals with a strike, between two parties
who are members of such council, in accordance with the procedures prescribed in
its constitution the strike will be protected.
3084.4.3 As a counter to an unprotected lock out
Where an employer elects to lock-out employees and fails to adhere to the 
procedures prescribed in the LRA,^®^ then the employees need not comply with the 
aforementioned procedural requirements. They may, in response to the lock-out.
engage in strike action which will be protected.
Significantly, the strike must be in response to the lock-out. Demands that are
not the subject matter of the lock-out cannot, therefore, be raised in the absence of
the union or employees complying with the ordinary procedural pre-conditions 
insofar as those extra demands are concerned.^'® If there has, in fact, been no lock-
307 Section 64(a) of the LRA. See also South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union v Yamtex 
(Pty) Ltd t/a Bertrand Group (2013) 34 ILL 1931 (LAC) and Plastic Convertors Association SA v 
AECMSA 2011 /Z/3007 (LC).
Section 64(3)(c) of the LRA.
Where the lock-out is not, in fact, unprotected then this exception is no longer applicable. See 
Cheadle op cit (n6) 62 and Kgasago v Meat Plus CC [1999] 5 BLLR 424 (LAC).
Cheadle op cit (n6) 62. See also NUMSA v NEASA [2015] 3 BLLR (LC) where a lock-out was held 
to be unprotected because it sought to add new demands.
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out, then likewise, any subsequent strike action in response to the purported lock-out
311would be unprotected.
Unilateral change to terms and conditions of employment^4.4.4
Section 64(4) of the LRA provides that any employee or trade union that
refers a dispute about a unilateral change to terms and conditions of employment to 
the CCMA, or appropriate bargaining council, may require^ that the employer 
refrain from implementing such change for a period of 30 days, or until such time as
the dispute has been conciliated,^or where the change has so been implemented
restore the terms and conditions of employment for the aforementioned periods. In
accordance with s 64(5) of the LRA, the employer has 48 hours within which to do
so.
Sections 64(4) and 64(5) of the LRA must be read in conjunction with s
64(3)(e) of the LRA which, in turn, provides that strike action may be undertaken.
without the need to adhere to the procedural prescripts of the LRA where the
employer fails to adhere to the obligation to refrain from imposing or restoring terms
and conditions of employment which have unilaterally been amended.
311 See for instance MTO Forestry (Pty) Ltd v Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied 
Workers Union [2018] 10 BLLR 950 (LC).
See Cheadle op cit (n6) 62 and Grogan op cit (n44) 416.
This requires an active act on the part of the union / employees. See Cheadle op cit (n6) 63 and 
Mukwevho v ECCAWUSA [1999] 4 BLLR 358 (LC).
Eskom vNUMSA [2002] 12 BLLR 1153 (LAC).
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The aforementioned sections indicate that the changes must have been made 
unilaterally^ and must have pertained to the employees' terms and conditions of
employment. This is in contrast to, for instance, workplace policies and procedures
which may be amended at the discretion of the employer.^*® Where, however, the
unilateral change 'may otherwise be referred to arbitration or adjudication in terms of
i317the LRA or any other employment law. then this mode of recourse is not
available.
4.5 Substantive requirements
Besides the procedural requirements, a party seeking to avoid engaging in
unprotected strike action must also comply with a number of substantive
requirements as set out below.
Collective agreements4.5.1
4.5.1.1 Section 65(l)(a) of the LRA
Section 65(1 )(a) of the LRA provides that 'no person may take part in a
strike.. .or in any conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike.. .if that person
315 See Staff Association for the Motor and Related Industries (SAMRI) v Toyota of South Africa 
Motors (Pty) Ltd [1998] 6 BLLR 616 (LC). The employees must not have subsequently consented 
to the change to the terms and conditions of their employment.
See for instance Apollo Tyres South Africa v NUMSA [2012] 6 BLLR 544 (LC). This may not 
apply where the policies and procedmes have been incorporated by reference in, for instance, an 
employment contract as terms and conditions of employment.
Cheadle op cit (n6) 63.
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is bound by a collective agreement that prohibits a strike.. .in respect of the issue
i318 Provisions regulating strike action regarding a particular dispute arein dispute.
colloquially referred to as 'peace-clauses.'
Section 213 of the LRA defines a 'collective agreement' as a 'written
agreement concerning terms and conditions of employment or any other matter of
mutual interest concluded by one or more registered trade imions, on the one hand,
and, on the other hand, one or more employers, one or more registered employer's
organisations or one or more employers and one or more registered employer's
organisations.'
The purpose of this provision is consistent with the LRA's emphasis on
industrial self-governance. A union is fi-ee to 'contract [its] members out of the right
I 319 Where the substantive nature of the dispute is regulated in the collectiveto strike.
agreement any subsequent strike action over such an issue would be unprotected.
This will be the case even where the CCMA has issued a certificate of outcome.^^” In
321County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v FA JVU, the Court had to consider the extent of the
prohibition and whether it also applied to particular dispute resolution procedures?
The Court held that the prohibition did not extend to pre-strike procedures.
318 Emphasis added.
Grogan op cit (n44) 418.
Vodacom (Pty) Ltd v CWU [2010] 8 BLLR 836 (LAC). See also Glencore Operations South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd V National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa [2018] 10 BLLR 1022 (LC).
[2001] 5 BLLR 494 (LAC). See also BMW South Africa (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA obo Members [2012] 
3 BLLR 274 (LAC) and Cheadle op cit (n6) 109.
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Any party bound by a collective agreement remains bound to that agreement
322for its duration even if they are no longer members of the union concerned. This is
not to say that a party cannot engage in strike action regarding future agreements.
323notwithstanding the fact that the current agreement has yet to expire.
The question arises as to who can be bormd by a collective agreement to
which they are not a party. In terms of s 23(1 )(d) of the LRA, a collective agreement
can be extended to employees who are not members of the registered trade union
provided certain conditions are met. In South African Airway (Soc) Ltd v South
324African Cabin Crew Association, the Court had cause to consider whether a
collective agreement had been extended to non-parties in terms of s 23(l)(d) of the
LRA. The Court held that s 23(l)(d) of the LRA allows for a collective agreement to 
be extended to a minority union if:^^^
.326The employees are identified in the agreement;(a)
(b) The agreement expressly binds the employees; and
That trade union or those trade rmions have as their members the majority of(c)
employees employed by the employer in the workplace.
322 Cheadle op cit (n6) 109. See Vista University v Botha [1997] 5 BLLR 614 (LC).
323 South African National Security Employers Association v TGWU [1998] 4 BLLR 364 (LAC) 
[hereafter 'TGWU]. Van Niekerk op cit (29) 422.
(J949/17) 2017 ZALCJHB (10 May 2017) [hereafter 'Cabin Crew Association'].
325 See NUMSA obo Members v Transnet SOC Ltd 2018] 5 BLLR 488 (LAC).
This is a strict requirement. See for instance, Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Association of Mineworkers 
and Construction Union 2017) 38 ILL969 (LC).
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The Court held that these conditions had been met thereby confirming the
principle that a party need not be a signatory to the collective agreement to be bound
by the terms thereof in appropriate circumstances. In this regard:
'If a collective agreement has been extended to non-parties, it binds those 
parties. No person would be allowed to strike if boimd by a collective 
agreement that prohibits a strike or that regulates the issues in dispute. The 
extension of collective agreements to non-party employees effectively denies 
them the right to strike in respect of the issues regulated by the collective 
agreement. i327
However, there is an exception to the principle that minority unions may not
strike where a collective agreement has been extended to them and their members in
terms of section 21(3)(d) of the LRA: where collective agreements impose
bargaining thresholds for organisational rights. This issue is discussed more fully
below.
Section 28(l)(i) of the LRA provides that 'the powers and functions of a
bargaining council in relation to its registered scope include the following.. .to
determine by collective agreement the matters which may not be an issue in dispute
for the purposes of a strike.. .at the workplace.' Agreements made in a bargaining
council may also be extended to non-parties provided the procedures set out in s 32
of the LRA are adhered to.^^*
TGWU supra (n323) para 40. This principle survived constitutional challenge in Association of 
Mineworkers and Construction Union v Chamber of Mines of South Africa [2017] 7 BLLR 641
(CC).
^^®See Free Market Foundation v Minister of Labour [2016] ZAGPPHC 266 where the 
constitutionality of s 32 of the LRA was upheld. In AMCU v Minister of Labour (case number 
JR46/16) the Court held that where a party wishes to challenge an extension of an agreement in
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4.5.1.2 Section 65(3)(a) of the LRA
Section 65(3)(a) of the LRA states that 'subject to a collective agreement, no
person may take part a strike.. .or in any conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a
strike., .if that person is bound by any collective agreement that regulates the issue
i329 Note the difference in wording between s 65(l)(a) of the LRA and sin dispute.
65(3)(a) of the LRA. Whereas the latter section merely requires the collective
agreement to 'regulate' the issue in dispute the former requires it to be prohibited.
So, in Cape Gate (Pty) the Co\irt held that where a bargaining council
main agreement regulated the issue in dispute (wages for the period), any strike
action regarding this issue, such as agitating for higher wages, would be unprotected.
The Court held that:
'The objective underlying the clause is to ensure that negotiation of such 
matters takes place only at the level of the bargaining council and in no other 
forum, such as at plant level. It is also to preclude any strike action over such 
matters while they continue to be regulated by the main agreement. The 
clause would make little sense if it had the effect now contended for on 
behalf of NUMSA, namely that where wage increases are determined in the 
main agreement, employees and their unions are free to agitate for further 
increases by way of plant level negotiation and ultimately strike action. This 
would be subversive of the objective of promoting collective bargaining at 
Ihe level of bargaining councils and the effectiveness of their agreements. .331
terms of s 32 they must claim that the election to extend the agreement was mala fide, capricious 
or arbitrary.
Emphasis added.
[2007] 5 BLLR 446 (LC), Du Toit op cit (n69).
Para 38.
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Employees may strike where the agreement merely requires negotiation on an
332issue and the negotiations have been unsuccessful. It has also been held that an
agreement that removes the possibility of plant-level bargaining in favour of 
centralised bargaining is enforceable,subject to the caveat that it is made clear that
334plant level bargaining is excluded.
Interestingly the reference to 'regulates' includes not only substantive issues
but also procedural issues. In Cabin Crew Association,the Court gave
consideration to what is meant by the issue in dispute being regulated by a collective
agreement. The Court held that 'in the end, it is thus contemplated by the provisions
of s 65(3)(a)(i) [of the ERA] that the issue in dispute forming the subject matter of
the strike can be regulated by collective agreement not only by way of determining
the substance of the issue in dispute itself, but in prescribing a process or structure in
i336terms of which the issue in dispute must be bargained and determined. It is
submitted that this approach, as opposed to that contained in County Fair,^^^ is the
correct one. It is not clear why, in the interests of voluntarism and self-regulation, a
332 Grogan op cit(n44) at419.See^z> Chefs (Pty) Ltd v SATAWU& Others (2013) 34 ILJ 119 (LC). 
Yamtex op cit (n307).
Grogan op cit (n44) 419 and 423. See Concor Projects (Pty) Ltd t/a Concor Opencast Mining v 
CCM4 (2013) 34 lU 2217 (LC) and CSS Tactical (Pty) Ltd v Security Officers Civil Rights & 
Allied Workers Union (2015) 36 IU21(A (LAC).
Supra (n324).
Para 53. See also Fidelity Guards v PTWU [1997] 11 BLLR 1424 (LC).
Supra (n305).
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party cannot regulate both substantive and procedural issues within a collective
338agreement.
4.5.2 Employee bound by an agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration
Section 65(l)(b) of the LRA provides that 'no person may take part in a
strike.. .or in any conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike.. .if that person
is bound by an agreement that requires the issue in dispute to be referred to
arbitration.' Note that the reference to 'agreement' is wider than a reference to
'collective agreement.'
Issues in dispute referred to arbitration / Labour Court4.5.3
General legal position4.5.3.1
Section 65(1 )(c) of the LRA provides that 'no person may take part in a
strike.. .or in any conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike.. .if the issue in
dispute is on that a party has the right to refer to arbitration or the to the Labour 
Court in terms of [the LRA] or any other employment law.'^^^ The reference to
'any other employment law' was introduced by way of amendment with effect of 1
340January 2015 and significantly expands the ambit of this provision.
To this end the dictum by Waglay DJP Supra (n304) above is apposite.
339 Emphasis added. The amendment was effected in terms of the Labour Relations Amendment Act 8 
of Act 6 of 2014,
Effectively overturning the ruling in TSI Holdings (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA [2004] 6 BLLR 600 (LC).340
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This section distinguishes between justiciable disputes (traditionally referred
to as disputes of right) and disputes of mutual interest. Judge Steenkamp also 
highlights a further exception present in Apollo Tyres South Africa (Pty) Ltd v 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration^^^ where employees may
strike over benefits provided the fairness of conduct regarding the benefits is not
challenged.^^2
3434.5.3.2 Exception: organisational rights
Section 65(2)(a) of the ERA provides that
'Despite section 65 (l)(c), a person may take part in a strike or a lock-out or 
in any conduct in contemplation or in fiirtherance of a strike or lock-out if the 
issue in dispute is about any matter dealt with in sections 12 to 15 [of the 
ERA].’
Organisational rights, which are dealt with in ss 12 to 16 of the ERA, are
divided among those that 'can only be obtained, as a matter or right, by majority
unions and those that can be obtained by ‘sufficiently representative unions.If an
employer refuses to grant such rights the union may approach the CCMA, in terms of
s 21 of the ERA, for the acquisition of such rights. Section 21 of the ERA provides
341 [2013]5BLLR434(LAC).
Cheadle op cit (n6) 110. See also Mawethu Civils (Pty) Limited and v National Union of 
Mineworkers [2016] JOL 36070 (LAC) where a dispute regarding a benefit was regarded as 
unprotected.
See A Van Heerden 'Assignment 2: Collective Labour Law' University of Cape Town (6 October 
2015), s 17(3) of the Industrial Action Code and PAK Le Roux, 'Organisational rights; an update' 
(2018) 27(6) Contemporary Labour Law 67.
Van Heerden op cit (n343).
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for a procedure by which a 'union may obtain organisational rights in specified
circumstances. After the matter is conciliated the union has an election, provided it
meets the necessary representation thresholds, to either to arbitrate the dispute or
strike in support of any of the organisational rights contained in ss 12 to 15 of the
In Bader the Court 'expressly recognised a union’s right to embark upon
strike action for the purposes of concluding an agreement providing it organisational
rights^"^ even in instances where the union did not have the necessary representation.
This is because the Court 'eschewed a narrow reading of s 20 of the LRA, holding
instead that:'^'^®
'a better reading is to see section 20 [of the LRA] as an express confirmation of 
the internationally recognised rights of minority unions to seek to gain access 
to the workplace, the recognition of their shopstewards as well as other 
organisational facilities through the techniques of collective bargaining. i349
Section 65(2)(b) of the LRA provides that where a representative trade union
makes an election to strike for organisational rights and issues a strike notice instead
of referring the matter to arbitration it is barred from adopting the arbitration route
for a period of 12 months from the date of such strike notice.
345 Van Heerden op cit (n343). Section 65(2)(a) of the LRA provides that a union may not strike in 
support of rights in terms of s 16 of the LRA
Supra (nil).
Section 20 of the LRA.
Van Heerden op eit (n343).
Para 41.
34fi
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While the LRA sets 'the standard thresholds^^^’required for the acquisition of
organisational rights, parties to a collective bargaining relationship may also
establish their own thresholds for the acquisition of such rights.'^^^ As discussed
above the threshold agreement may be extended to non-parties in terms of either ss
23(1 )(d) or 32 of the LRA.
Where a threshold agreement has been concluded in terms of s 18 of the 
LRA^^^ and extended in terms of s 23(l)(d) of the LRA the question remains whether
a minority union and employer may nonetheless enter into an agreement in terms of s 
20 of the LRA^^^ or engage in strike action in so far as compelling an employer to
grant such rights.
la South African Correctional Services Workers Union (SACOSWU) v Police
and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU)f^^ the Court held that a threshold
agreement concluded in terms of s 18 of the LRA merely provided what threshold a
union must meet to become a sufficiently representative union by way of right.
Nothing however precluded such a union fi'om striking in support of organisational
rights. The Court held that:
350 Note that these thresholds have been amended in order to provide greater opportunity for minority 
unions to obtain rights in the workplace. See ss 21 (8 A) to (8D) of the LRA.
Van Heerden op cit (n343).
Ibid. Section 18 allows a majority union to establish an agreement regulating the thresholds for 
Organisational rights in terms of ss 12, 13 and 15 of the LRA. This threshold can then be extended 
by virtue of s 21 (3)(d) of the LRA.
Section 20 of the LRA provides that 'nothing in this Part [of the LRA] precludes the conclusion of 
a collective agreement that regulates Organisational rights.'
[2017] 9 BLLR 905 (LAC). This ruling was confirmed by way of an obiter comment by the 
Constitutional Court iaPOPCRUv SACOSWU{CCT 152/17) (23 August 2018).
351
353
354
91
'While s 23(1) provides that a collective agreement is binding on the parties 
to it, a threshold agreed by an employer obliges the employer to confer ssl2, 
13 and si5 rights upon a union which had achieved the threshold agreed in 
the si 8(1) agreement. It does not bar the employer from bargaining 
collectively with a minority union which seeks to have any organisational 
rights conferred on it, nor does the existence ofasl8(l) agreement oblige the 
employer to deprive a minority union of any such organisational rights. 1355
The Court overturned the ruling of the Court a quo’s,^^® which held that a
threshold agreement extended to minority unions could bind them in terms of s
64(3)(a) of the LRA.
Employees bound by arbitration awards and ministerial determinations or4.5.4
determinations made in terms of chapter eight of the BCEA
Section 65(3)(a)(i) of the LRA provides that 'subject to a collective
agreement, no person may take part in a strike.. .or in any conduct in contemplation
or furtherance of a strike.. .if that person is bound by an arbitration award.. .that
regulates the issue in dispute.' As Grogan notes there are:
'two related reasons for den5dng protection to workers who strike over issues 
that have been determined by an arbitration award; first, the dispute has been 
finally determined; secondly, the issue is no longer in dispute. .357
Para 36.
356 POPCRUvLedwaba NO 11 BLLR 1137 (LC). 
Grogan op cit (n44) 423.357
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Section 65(3)(a)(ii) provides that 'subject to a collective agreement, no
person may take part in a strike.. .or in any conduct in contemplation or furtherance
of a strike.. .if that person is bound by any determination made in terms of s 44 that
regulates the issue in dispute.'
Section 65(3)(b) provides that 'subject to a collective agreement, no person may
take part in a strike.. .or in any conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike
[regarding] any determination made in terms of Chapter Eight of the BCEA and that
regulates the issue in dispute, during the first year of that determination.'
Essential and maintenance services^^*4.5.5
Section 65(1 )(d) of the ERA provides that 'no person may take part in a
strike... or in any conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike.. .if that person
is engaged in an essential service or a maintenance service.' An 'essential service' is
defined as 'a service the interruption of which endangers the life, personal safety or
health of the whole or any part of the population, the Parliamentary service [and/or] 
the South Afiican Police Force.A 'maintenance service' is a service where 'the
interruption of that service has the effect of material physical destruction to any
working area, plant or machinery.'
358 For a useful summary of essential and maintenance services see T Cohen and R Le Roux 
'Limitations on the Right to Strike in the Public Sector and Essential Services' in B Hepple,R Le 
Roux, and Silvana Sciarra (eds) Laws against Strikes: The South African Experience in an 
International and Comparative Perspective (2016) Juta, Cape Town at 108 to 125.
Section 213 of the LRA [hereafter 'ESC']. However, see SA Police Service v POPCRU (2011) 32 
lU 1603 (CC) where it was held that limitation on SAPS only applied to police officers and not 
support staff.
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Essential and maintenance service fall under the auspices of the Essential 
Services Committee.^*^® Essential service employees are prohibited from engaging in
strike action. All disputes which would, if not for the fact they were part of an 
essential service, be strikeable matters are referred to arbitration.^®^
Section 71 of the ERA states that the ESC may investigate whether to declare
a service essential. Section 70B of the ERA provides further that 'the powers and
functions of the ESC are to.. .decide, on its own initiative or at the reasonable request
of any interested party, whether to institute investigations as to whether or not the
whole or part of any service is an essential service.' If they so elect to declare a
service essential it is published in the government gazette. Any party may refer a
dispute to the ESC to determine whether a particular service is an essential service.
Maintenance services are established either by way of collective agreement.
by way of a panel appointed by the ESC or by way of application to the ESC. Those
employees who are engaged in maintenance services are likewise precluded from
engaging in strike action. Rather they are entitled to arbitrate any dispute which they
would ordinarily be able to strike on. Section 76(1 )(a) of the ERA provides that 'an
employer may not take into employment any person to continue or maintain
production during a protected strike if the whole or a part of the employer's service
has been designated a maintenance service.' The trade-off for an employer in having
See ss 70 to 75 of the LRA for the regulation of the essential services committee, essential services 
and maintenance services.
Section 74 of the LRA.
94
a maintenance service established is the prohibition on the use of replacement 
labour.^^2
Where some of the employees are engaged in an essential service and others
are not, the employees that are not engaged in an essential service may engage in
strike action. This does not deprive the essential workers from arbitrating the same
363dispute.
^“Section 76(l)(a) of the LRA.
363 City of Cape Town v SALGBC (2011) 32 71/1318 (LC). Grogan op cit (n44) 425.
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5 Conclusion
The nature of'unprotected' strike action, in South African law, is inextricably
intertwined with what constitutes 'protected' strike action. Where collective action
meets the definition of a strike, then such strike action will be protected provided it
complies with the substantive and procedural requirements contained in the LRA.
Conversely, any conduct fitting the definition of 'strike aetion' that fails to comply
with the procedural and/or substantive requirements of the LRA will be unprotected.
It is important then to understand the speeific hurdles that must be overeome for each
procedural and substantive requirement in order to avoid a strike being rendered
unprotected. It is also important that regard be had to nuanced areas of strike law so
that pitfalls may be avoided by employers, employees and employee
representatives/trade unions alike.
The process of providing clarity in this regard has been assisted, in part, by the recent
introduction of file Industrial Action Code. The Industrial Action Code has provided
a useful summation of what is required for specified procedural and substantive
requirements to be met. The Industrial Action Code is not without its problematic
additions; additions which may muddy the waters and facilitate litigation instead of
providing clarity and certainty.
While in most instances the elucidation provided for in the Industrial Action Code is
a distillation of relevant case authority there are instances where the Industrial Action
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Code goes further than established law (by trying to introduee the notion of good
faith bargaining and having parties agree to a notice period that may be excess in the
minimum period provided for by the LRA). The manner in which the courts apply
these particular provisions will be given substance to in due course. This much is
clear by virtue of the fact that courts are obliged to consider the terms of the
Industrial Action Code as per s 203 of the LRA.
The purpose of the LRA is to facilitate peaceful and healthy collective bargaining.
Crucial to the framework of the LRA's collective bargaining regime is the ability of
workers to mobilise in a peaceful manner in an attempt to secure their demands
against their employer.
The LRA is clear in providing that strike action must be peaceful. It is not a licence
to engage in acts of violence. While protected strike action provides immunity from
dismissal, delictual liability and civil liability, such immimity extends only to
employee engaging in protected strike action. It does not extend to unprotected strike
action or unlawful conduct (regardless of whether the strike is protected or not).
Where employees fail to comply with the procedural and substantive requirements of
the LRA and/or engage in acts of criminality no such protection is afforded to them.
The recent amendments to the LRA as well as the Industrial Action Code make
specific mention of the violent nature of unprotected strikes within South Africa and
the importance of curbing same. Both seek to introduce mechanisms aimed at
avoiding such action in the future although they stop short of suggesting an otherwise
protected strike can be rendered unprotected by violent conduct. The extent to which
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unprotected strike action, and particularly violent strike action, persists
notwithstanding such mechanisms remains an open question. As some commentators
have noted the main driving force behind the level of violent strike action in South
Africa may be driven largely by socio-economic factors as opposed to legislative
provisions having been found to be wanting. In such instances, the solution falls
outside the realm of pure legal consideration. Such a debate is beyond the scope of
this dissertation. It is nevertheless the hope that when parties have clarity on what
falls foul of protected strike action they can more easily conduct themselves in a
manner consistent with the law.
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